Divisive rule: sectarianism and power maintenance in the Arab Spring: Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria by Wimmen, Heiko
www.ssoar.info
Divisive rule: sectarianism and power maintenance
in the Arab Spring: Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and
Syria
Wimmen, Heiko
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Wimmen, H. (2014). Divisive rule: sectarianism and power maintenance in the Arab Spring: Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon
and Syria. (SWP Research Paper, 4/2014). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für
Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-385599
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
SWP Research Paper 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
German Institute for International  
and Security Affairs 
Heiko Wimmen 
Divisive Rule 
Sectarianism and Power Maintenance in the 
Arab Spring: Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria 
RP 4 
March 2014 
Berlin 
 All rights reserved. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik, 2014 
SWP Research Papers are 
peer reviewed by senior 
researchers and the execu-
tive board of the Institute. 
They express exclusively 
the personal views of the 
author(s). 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft  
und Politik  
German Institute  
for International  
and Security Affairs 
Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 
10719 Berlin 
Germany 
Phone  +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax  +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1863-1053 
 Table of Contents 
 5 Problems and Conclusions 
 7 Bahrain 
 7 Political Contestation and Sectarianism 
 9 Sectarianism and the 2011 Uprising 
 12 Iraq 2011/2013 
 12 Sectarianism and Political Conflict in Iraq 
 14 Sectarianism in the 2011 Mobilizations 
 15 From Iraqi Spring to Sunni Spring 
 16 Lebanon 2005/2011 
 17 Sect and State 
 18 Sect, Resistance, and the 2005 Uprising 
 19 2011: Beirut Spring Reloaded 
 21 Syria 
 21 Sect, Power, and Violence 
 23 Sectarianism in the Syrian Uprising 
 26 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 28 Recommendations 
 
 
 
  
Heiko Wimmen is an Associate in the Middle East and 
Africa Division of SWP and coordinator of the project 
“Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world.” 
The project is realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik (SWP). It is funded by the German Foreign Office in 
the framework of the transformation partnerships with the 
Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with 
the PhD grant program of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the 
Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 
 
 
 Problems and Conclusions 
Divisive Rule 
Sectarianism and Power Maintenance in the 
Arab Spring: Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria 
After long-ruling autocrats were toppled in Tunisia 
and Egypt in early 2011, a wave of public protests 
against authoritarianism, corruption, and state in-
competence swept across the Arab world. In due 
course the Arab Spring reached four deeply divided 
societies whose recent history had seen ethnic and 
sectarian conflict and sometimes extreme violence. 
While sharing that trait they differ substantially with 
regard to the state’s capacity for shaping and main-
taining the political order. Lebanon and post-2003 Iraq 
are examples of weak states that are incapable of con-
trolling political actors who exploit sectarian identity 
politics in the interests of external patrons and their 
claims on power and resources. Pre-2003 Iraq, Syria 
and to a lesser extent Bahrain are cases where authori-
tarian rulers used the tools of a strong state for strat-
egies of divide and rule that prevent social actors from 
mounting a challenge to their maintenance of power. 
The concern among many observers and policy-
makers was hence that bottom-up mobilizations 
modeled on Tunisia and Egypt might sweep away 
whatever safeguards of stability and control existed 
in these countries, and set communities against 
each other, or regimes against specific communities, 
in violent and destructive conflict. The challenged 
regimes and their supporters played their part in 
nurturing such fears, among foreign allies and local 
followers alike, so as to present themselves as the only 
safeguards of stability. Supporters of the protest move-
ments, on the other hand, rejected such warnings as 
patently self-serving when coming from the regimes, 
and accused foreign actors of ulterior motives, such as 
defending allies and strategic interests. 
Initially, it appeared that the concerns were indeed 
exaggerated; perhaps a product of the same dismis-
sive (or Orientalist) mindset that had discounted the 
chances for democratization in the Arab World per 
se, and prevented most analysts from spotting the 
momentum that had been building up towards the 
2011 uprisings. As in Tunisia and Egypt, the protest 
movements in the four states analyzed here initially 
remained largely peaceful, and adopted discourses 
that emphasized popular unity against authoritarian, 
corrupt, and divisive rulers and political elites. To a 
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Problems and Conclusions 
limited extent, they also succeeded in attracting sup-
port across the lines that divide these societies. For a 
brief historical moment, their cross-cutting appeal 
even appeared capable of overcoming these divisions 
and creating narratives of national unity and reconciliation 
in and through popular struggle against political 
oppression and for social justice. 
This was a powerful claim. With the partial excep-
tion of the Kurdish areas of Iraq and Syria, national 
unity is a highly valued ideal in all four countries, 
despite – or perhaps, precisely because of – the exist-
ing divisions. Governments and political actors build 
a significant part of their legitimacy on claiming to 
defend the unity of the nation and contain dangerous 
internal strife. By advancing their own narrative of 
national unity, these movements threatened to pull 
the rug from under such techniques of rule, and claim 
this source of legitimacy for themselves. 
Eventually, the skeptics were proved right. Shored 
up by its royal Gulf allies and applauded by political 
actors claiming to represent the country’s Sunni 
community, the regime in Bahrain crushed the mas-
sive uprising in this tiniest of all Arab states, and 
meted out collective punishment to the Shiite popu-
lation. In Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki con-
tained Baghdad’s own Tahrir Square movement 
through a skillful mix of repression and sectarian 
counter-mobilization, only to harvest a deadly wave 
of sectarian violence two years on. Lebanon’s 2005 
“Intifada of Independence,” arguably the region’s first 
and most successful example of a bottom-up move-
ment, soon led to bitter confrontation between Sunni 
and Shiite Lebanese. In early 2011, a movement for 
“the fall of the sectarian regime” initially gained trac-
tion but ultimately fell back into the old sectarian 
divides. In Syria, mostly peaceful demonstrations 
against the corrupt and sectarian Assad regime 
reached massive proportions by the summer of 2011, 
but equally massive regime violence turned political 
contestation into devastating sectarian strife and pro-
vided an opening for militant Sunni Islamists. In all 
four countries, the outcome was violence and even 
deeper divisions. 
The purpose of this study is to show that these 
outcomes were neither pre-ordained, nor were the 
ensuing conflicts generated by “ancient sectarian 
hatreds” that had been bottled-up by authoritarian 
control and self-ignited when released. While existing 
grievances and the lingering memory of past violence 
and victimization certainly created dangerous envi-
ronments for contentious politics, it took concrete 
political decisions to set these ingredients alight and 
create conflagration. Ruling regimes and established 
political leaders had a vested interest in turning peace-
ful movements that aimed to unite people against 
their abusive power into a violent conflict that would 
send these same people scrambling for protection by 
whoever had the power to do so. They also had control 
over the necessary means: institutions and followers 
prepared to apply violence, and media to frame it in 
ways that served the desired purpose. Finally, ongoing 
strategic competition over influence in the region pro-
vided hardliners bent on confrontation with sources 
of external support and leverage and license they may 
not have otherwise had. 
On the other hand, a number of shortcomings spe-
cific to divided societies prevented these movements 
from realizing the full potential of their initial in-
clusive appeal, and hence, from achieving the broad, 
cross-cleavage solidarity that was essential for the 
successes achieved by comparable movements else-
where. Instead, cross-sectarian support dwindled as 
the crisis wore on, and the movements either dis-
appeared or became parties in the conflict they had 
set out to transcend. 
The conclusion from these painful experiences 
should not be that authoritarianism is the least bad 
or the only workable solution for divided societies, 
let alone that Europeans should acquiesce to or even 
condone such forms of rule. As demonstrated by the 
catastrophe in Syria (and before it, Yugoslavia), sup-
pressing ethnic and sectarian conflict will not make 
it disappear, and authoritarian rule cultivates such 
conflicts at least as much as it contains them. Rather, 
Europe should provide active support to the constitu-
encies and potentials for cross-sectarian solidarity 
that exist in all four countries, support the presently 
stalled formal national reconciliation processes in 
Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon, and steer the diplomatic 
process around the Syrian crisis in a similar direction. 
Since the conflicts in all four countries are fueled by 
the strategic competition between Iran and the GCC 
countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, Europe should 
seek cooperation with both sides that addresses their 
mutual security concerns. 
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 Bahrain 
 
In the fall of 2010, parliamentary elections in Bahrain 
were accompanied by yet another of the waves of 
arrests of human rights defenders and political activ-
ists that have characterized this small island state 
for decades.1 Inspired by events in Tunisia and Egypt, 
anonymous online activists started calling for a “Day 
of Rage” at the end of January 2011.2 On February 14, 
decentralized protests sprang up in 55 neighborhoods 
across the archipelago, in most cases numbering only 
a few hundred participants. The first fatality was 
reported that evening. 
The funeral procession held the next day led to 
further confrontation and a second fatality, after 
which protesters set up a makeshift camp at “Pearl 
Roundabout,” a major traffic node on the western 
edge of Manama’s financial district. The camp was 
cleared by riot police on February 17, leaving four 
more dead. Two days later, when the reform-minded 
wing of the royal family temporarily prevailed, the 
police were withdrawn and the protestors again set 
up camp. For the next four weeks, Pearl Roundabout 
became the focal point for public debates, political 
action, and massive demonstrations.3 As time pro-
gressed, the demands grew: instead of constitutional 
monarchy and the reforms that the legal opposition 
parties and regime representatives wrangled over in 
a hastily convened “National Dialogue,”4 protesters 
increasingly called for a republic, or demanded the 
immediate fall of King Hamad. On February 21, a 
counter-demonstration declaring allegiance to the 
Al-Khalifa dynasty was convened on the other side 
of town by prominent Sunni clerics and politicians 
claiming to represent the Sunni community. 
1  Jon Marks, “Bahrain Returns to the Bad Old Days,” 
Guardian, September 13, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2010/sep/13/bahrain-opposition-protests. 
Slightly less than 50 percent of the country’s inhabitants hold 
Bahraini citizenship.  
2  The Facebook page “February 14 – Revolution in Bahrain” 
(https://www.facebook.com/TrueRoyalDemocracy; Arabic) was 
established on January 26. 
3  Amal Khalaf, “Squaring the Circle: Bahrain’s Pearl Round-
about,” Middle East Critique 22, no. 3, (2013): 265–80. 
4  In Bahrain, so-called “political associations” perform the 
role of parties, and are referred to as such in this study. 
Violence soon followed, providing the pretext for 
the (mostly Saudi) troops of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council’s “Peninsula Shield Force” to enter the coun-
try on March 14, and the second clearing of Pearl 
Roundabout three days later. The ensuing waves of 
repression amounted to an organized witch hunt.5 
Almost three years later, the political process remains 
paralyzed and the National Dialogue stalled, while the 
main opposition parties boycott parliament. Low-level 
protests and violence occur on a daily basis in Shiite 
neighborhoods, while opposition leaders and activists 
languish in prison on threadbare charges. 
Political Contestation and Sectarianism 
The events of 2011 followed a long-established pat-
tern: Whenever Bahrain’s rulers found their position 
challenged – by demands for participation, rivalries 
within the dynasty, or loss of foreign support – they 
would reach out to domestic opponents, but always 
stop short of relinquishing control over governance 
and resources. Once the challenges had been warded 
off, mechanisms of participation were rolled back or 
emptied of content, and ensuing protest violently 
crushed. 
Thus the loss of direct British protection in 1973 
yielded the first constitution and parliament, to be 
suspended two years later after the United States 
assumed the United Kingdom’s regional role and in-
creased oil revenues provided the means to buy domes-
tic consent. After 1989, the global trend for democ-
ratization and the American interest in stabilizing 
the region prompted certain concessions to a nascent 
constitutional movement; when international and 
American attention shifted to events in Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, Bahrain soon slid into its own violent 
“Intifada.” When the new Emir (later King) Hamad 
attempted to create his own power base in 1999, he 
sought and received popular support for his reformist 
“National Action Charter”; yet after he had secured his 
position and the impending invasion of Iraq ensured 
5  Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, http:// 
www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf. 
SWP Berlin 
Sectarianism and Power Maintenance in the Arab Spring:  
Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria 
March 2014 
 
 
7 
 
 
Bahrain 
unwavering US support,6 he imposed a constitution 
that left parliament with little power. Blatant gerry-
mandering ensured a loyal majority even in this emas-
culated assembly, leading to an opposition boycott 
and new cycles of unrest. 
Conversely, the political opposition has struggled 
and on most occasions failed to maintain unity be-
tween advocates of accommodation and proponents of 
confrontation. Movements and parties have repeatedly 
fractured into “radicals,” who refuse to legitimize pro-
cesses without substance, and “moderates” who prefer 
to be part of any process. Thus, the patterns of con-
testation that emerged over a period of six decades 
became predictable in their sequences and outcomes, 
often pitting the same actors against each other time 
and again.7 
Until the late 1970s, both regime and opposition 
avoided the issue of sectarian inequality generated by 
Bahrain’s process of state formation.8 On the eve of 
colonization in the late-eighteenth century, tribal 
Bedouin from the Arabian interior had established a 
system of feudal exploitation of (Shiite) natives by 
(Sunni) conquerors. By the 1930s British-led moderni-
zation had created opportunities to escape from 
feudal bondage through education and employment 
(some also advanced as clients and clerks of the feudal 
lords). It also attracted new (mostly Sunni) migrants 
from the Persian littoral, who were neither related 
nor necessarily loyal to the dynasty. But the majority 
of the Shiite population remained mired in poverty, 
and lack of access to the corridors of power kept their 
neighborhoods and villages underserved. 
Sectarian inequalities were not a prime concern of 
the traditional Bahraini opposition, which mobilized 
around ideological discourses (Arab nationalism and 
6  Bahrain hosts a United States Navy facility that is home to 
the US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet, 
and served as primary base for “Operation Iraqi Freedom” in 
2003. 
7  While dynastic rule by definition runs in the family, so 
do opposition and political activism, and many prominent 
activists continue the work of their fathers or in-laws. Most 
of the leaders of the 2011 uprising were veterans of the “Inti-
fada” of the 1990s. 
8  On the following, see Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain 
(Chicago, 1980); Abdulhadi Khalaf, Contentious Politics in Bahrain, 
http://www.smi.uib.no/pao/khalaf.html, 1998; Ute Meinel, 
Die Intifada im Ölscheichtum Bahrain (Münster, 2002); Justin 
Gengler, Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and 
the Arab Gulf (PhD Thesis, Ann Arbor, 2011), http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~jgengler/docs/diss/Dissertation%20-% 
20Combined,%20formatted.pdf. 
communism) and rejected sectarianism as backward 
and detrimental to the objectives of national and class 
unity. Their membership was mostly urban and had 
direct experience of cross-sectarian relationships 
in mixed workplaces and urban areas. On the other 
hand, many clients of the royal family were former 
allies from the conquering tribes and hence Sunni, 
but Bahrain’s rulers had no interest in systematically 
favoring one sect over the other. Rather, they strove to 
cultivate loyalists in all communities, not least Shiite 
clerics who could stem the dangerous influence of 
secular ideologies on the lower classes, and included 
many upwardly mobile Shiites in their networks of 
patronage. 
The Iranian revolution of 1979 fundamentally 
changed this equation. With its largely disenfran-
chised Shiite majority and authoritarian, pro-Western 
government, Bahrain appeared a natural target for 
Iranian ambitions to “export” its revolution. Whether 
this actually led to substantial Iranian sponsorship 
for subversive activities in Bahrain remains contest-
ed,9 but the suspicion has poisoned the relationship 
between the state and its Shiite citizens ever since. 
Doubts over their loyalty led to the exclusion of 
Shiites from employment in many fields, at a time 
when oil revenues were dwindling and unemploy-
ment rising. Economic reorientation towards retail, 
finance, and hospitality industry, and the concomi-
tant demise of unionized labor, meant that the num-
ber of Bahraini youth employed in urban, mixed 
workplaces (or any workplace at all) contracted by the 
mid-1990s, while residence in the mixed central areas 
of Manama became increasingly unaffordable even for 
those holding jobs. Consequently, a new generation of 
young, Iranian-trained Shiite clerics with a clear 
agenda of social activism succeeded in turning local 
mosques and community centers into nodes of 
political mobilization, and supplanted the traditional 
urban middle-class opposition parties.10 
9  For example, in late 1981 the Bahraini government 
arrested members of the Iranian-inspired and -sponsored 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) for allegedly 
planning terrorist attacks to trigger a general uprising of the 
Shiite population. For an overview of alleged Iranian schem-
ing against Bahrain see Mitchell A. Belfer, “The Fourteenth 
Province: The Irano-Bahraini Conflict in Perspective,” Central 
European Journal of Security Studies, July 18, 2011, http://www. 
cejiss.org/editors-desk/the-fourteenth-province-the-irano-
bahraini-conflict-in-perspective. 
10  Fred Lawson “Repertoires of Contestation in Bahrain,” in 
Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, 2003), 89–111. 
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Sectarianism and the 2011 Uprising 
Bigoted statements by some representatives of the 
royal family added sectarian insult to social injury,11 
as did the import of (mostly Sunni) labor from Paki-
stan, Syria and Jordan to fill positions with which 
Bahraini Shiites were not trusted, while their rapid 
naturalization was perceived as part of a broader 
agenda to tilt the demographic balance. Rather than 
overcoming the inherited sectarian gap through 
inclusive development, by the 1990s the Bahraini state 
was actively working to deepen it, and fueling resent-
ment among its Shiite citizens. 
Conversely, when the new Emir Hamad signaled in 
1999 that substantial social reform (most importantly 
scaling back foreign labor to free up jobs for working 
class Bahrainis) was on the cards, he was feted and 
hoisted on the shoulders of residents in Sitra, a hot-
bed of Shiite resistance.12 While it is true that, by the 
2000s, opposition against the Bahraini regime was 
dominated by political forces with a pronounced 
Shiite background, the issue was primarily partici-
pation and social justice, not sect. 
Sectarianism and the 2011 Uprising 
While the first calls for a “Day of Rage” originated 
from unidentified digital activists they were explicitly 
supported by illegal political groups identified with 
the Shiite population, such as Al-Haq, Al-Wafa, and 
the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement. The 
biggest opposition party Al-Wifaq – led by Shiite cleric 
Ali Salman – issued an implicit endorsement, as did 
the prominent cleric Isa Qasim in his Friday sermon 
preceding the event.13 The only non-Shiite party to 
11  In 1995, Sheikh Khalid Bin Hamad (a second cousin of the 
current ruler) wrote a notorious poem proposing the depor-
tation of the Shiite population to outlying islands. See Justin 
Gengler, “Royal Factionalism, the Khawalid, and the Securiti-
zation of ‘the Sh’i’a Problem’ in Bahrain,” Journal of Arabian 
Studies 3, no.1 (2013). A report drafted in 2006 by a (later 
deported) royal advisor claimed to have discovered a secret 
network to discredit Shiite parties and public figures, spon-
sored by members of the same royal faction. See Bahrain 
Center for Human Rights, “Al Bander Report”: Demographic 
Engineering in Bahrain and Mechanisms of Exclusion, September 
30, 2006, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/528. 
12  International Crisis Group, Bahrain’s Sectarian Challenge, 
Middle East Report 40 (May 6, 2005), 7, http://www. 
crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North 
%20 Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Bahrain/Bahrains%20Sectarian%20 
Challenge.pdf. 
13  A recording is available at http://albayan.org/islam/ 
sounds/Kotbat%20aljoma/438.wma (Arabic). 
come out in support was the leftist non-sectarian 
Waad. While social media and the widespread use of 
internet-enabled mobile devices certainly amplified 
the mobilization, many of these tools and tactics 
had already been introduced during the protests 
of the late 1990s. Digital activists themselves report 
encountering much skepticism, and attribute the 
eventual success of the mobilization to the active 
participation of prominent religious figures, such as 
Abdelwahhab Hussein, one of the main intellectual 
leaders of the 1990s Intifada, who headed one of the 
first marches on February 14.14 
Such support gave the call a momentum it could 
not have had otherwise, but also made it liable to ap-
pear as yet another attempt by “the Shiites” to better 
their lot, inevitably at the expense of others, or worse, 
to impose religious and political norms along the 
lines of the Iranian model. The protestors worked to 
counter such suspicions and make the movement as 
inclusive as possible. Some of the more aggressive 
elements of the established protest repertoire – in 
particular, blocking roads with burning tires – were 
avoided and non-violence was propagated.15 Political 
personalities identified with the Sunni population 
were showcased to underline the cross-sectarian char-
acter of the movement,16 badges and banners pro-
claiming cross-sectarian solidarity were ubiquitous, 
and ecumenical prayers were held.17 Emphasis was 
14  Interviews with activists Mohammed Al-Maskati, Ahmed 
Al-Widaei, Alaa Shehabi, May 2013. For an impartial first-
hand account see Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, 
Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Stanford, 2013), 
chapter 3. 
15  Abbas Al-Murshed, The Gulf Pattern of Political Change: The 
Economy of Sectarianism and Violence, Bahrain Center for Studies 
in London (Arabic, an English translation of very unsatis-
factory quality is available), http://www.bcsl.org.uk/en/ 
studies/download/14_9c56194a41981938093c509e13570c02. 
Local human rights activists had been arguing for such 
tactics for years and received training from the Serbian 
organization CANVAS; the Egyptian example helped their 
arguments prevail in 2011 (interview with Al-Maskati; 
Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf [see note 14], 47). 
16  Such as Ibrahim Sherif, leader of the Waad party or 
Mohamed Albuflasa, an independent politician and former 
military officer with links to the Salafi milieu. Oppositionists 
cite his arrest and prolonged detention immediately after a 
speech on February 15 as evidence that the regime felt espe-
cially threatened by expressions of solidarity from the more 
traditionalist Sunni milieu. 
17  Zainab Al-Khawaja, “Bahrain: Protesters Reject Sunni-Shia 
Split Claims,” Institute for War and Peace Recording, Arab Spring 
Issue 7 (March 23, 2011), http://iwpr.net/report-news/bahrain-
protesters-reject-sunni-shia-split-claims. 
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Bahrain 
placed on social demands and corruption – in par-
ticular, royal control over the country’s most valuable 
real estate – with which the vast majority of the 
population could identify. February 14, the “Day of 
Rage,” coincided with the tenth anniversary of the 
referendum in which an overwhelming majority of 
Bahrainis had endorsed King Hamad’s later aban-
doned reform agenda, and hence a touchstone of 
national consensus for democratic change. A sea 
of Bahraini flags and solemn commitments to Shiite-
Sunni understanding further underlined the national, 
rather than factional agenda. Perhaps most crucially, 
by establishing the camp at Pearl Square, the protest 
based itself at a place not associated with any sect, 
where members of all communities could meet on 
equal terms. 
Although there is evidence of some Sunni partici-
pation,18 assessing the sectarian composition of the 
crowd at Pearl Roundabout and hence the success of 
these strategies remains difficult, in particular as 
the question is directly linked to competing political 
claims. The issue was further complicated by the 
refusal of many protestors to disclose their sectarian 
background, on grounds that only Bahraini citizen-
ship should matter.19 Furthermore, the violence that 
accompanied the first clearing of the roundabout on 
February 17 made it increasingly difficult for the six 
legal political parties to prevail with their message 
of moderation and limited reform.20 Forces pushing 
for a republic with a merely ceremonial role for the 
House of Khalifa (or none at all) became dominant. For 
those who already suspected an undeclared sectarian 
agenda, these demands confirmed that the solemn 
commitments to national unity and non-sectarianism 
18  Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf (see note 14), 68; for interviews 
with protest participants see http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=UOqv7m9bF14&noredirect=1 (Arabic). The presence 
of Bahraini Shiites was very visible through known organi-
zations and individuals, and participants from conservative 
and religious milieus whose attire identified their sectarian 
affiliation. Sunnis from these milieus were mostly absent, 
and the sectarian affiliation of secular Bahrainis of Sunni 
and mixed background who did participate was much less 
obvious. 
19  Ibid. Comments on pro-opposition websites include dis-
missive statements such as “Sunnis sit at home while we are 
doing the fighting,” see e.g. http://www.alwasatnews.com/ 
3084/news/read/527416/1.html (Arabic). 
20  E-mail communication with representatives of the Waad 
party, June 2013; Abbas Al-Murshed, The February 14 Youth 
Coalition, Bahrain Center for Studies in London (October 16, 
2012) (Arabic), http://www.bcsl.org.uk/en/studies/download/ 
23_bf727a36143f982df409fba4242252c7. 
were purely tactical. Without royal power to offset 
their demographic advantage, Shiite political parties 
appeared poised to dominate the political system.21 
Accordingly, the counter-demonstration of Febru-
ary 21 expressed unwavering loyalty to the crown. 
Staging the event at and naming the counter-move-
ment after the Al-Fateh Mosque, as a location celebrat-
ing the eighteenth-century tribal conquest of Bahrain, 
clearly linked it to a national narrative identified 
with the Sunni community. The key role of politicians 
and clerics connected to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Salafist currents further underlined this, and 
their manifesto addressed the Bahraini public as two 
communities (the “Sunni and Shiite street”) while 
warning ominously against sectarian strife. They thus 
rejected the narrative of national unity advanced at 
Pearl Roundabout and implicitly raised the specter 
of violence, which until that moment had only origi-
nated from the regime.22 
That soon changed. Incendiary rhetoric from Salafi-
connected Sunni politicians generated outlandish 
threat scenarios.23 In early March, sectarian clashes 
erupted at the university and in mixed residential 
quarters, and roadblocks and vigilante groups sprang 
up amidst a flurry of rumors, leading to further alter-
cations. Protest organizers at Pearl Roundabout and 
Shiite clerics invested significant energy in defusing 
the violence, including a seven-kilometer human 
chain formed between Al-Fateh Mosque and Pearl 
Roundabout on March 5, 2011, but failed to include 
prominent Sunni figures in their efforts. 
To what extent the demonstration on February 21 
that initiated this escalation was a genuine expression 
of the feelings of Bahrainis who felt unrepresented 
or even threatened by Pearl Roundabout remains con-
21  The exact demographic balance is uncertain, but Al-Wifaq 
obtained well above 50 percent of the popular vote in the 
two elections it contested in 2006 and 2010, despite calls for 
a boycott by more radical Shiite groups. See Justin Gengler, 
And Then There Were None: Religion and Politics in Bahrain (April 
14, 2011), http://bahrainipolitics.blogspot.com/2011/04/and-
then-there-were-none.html. 
22  Footage of the rally is available at http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=efRwSoA9qwY (Arabic). The political group estab-
lished by the organizers of the demonstration called itself 
“The Gathering of National Unity.” 
23  For example on March 2, in a speech in Muharraq that 
was broadcast by a Salafi-leaning Saudi station, former 
MP Mohammed Khaled alleged that there were plans to rid 
Bahrain of all Sunnis, and called upon the community to 
establish vigilante groups, http://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=DK8X47q-tlY&noredirect=1 (Arabic). 
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Sectarianism and the 2011 Uprising 
tested. As a rally where a manifesto formulated by a 
small group of (Sunni) political and religious figures 
was read out, the event necessarily had a top-down 
character that stood in sharp contrast to the carni-
valesque atmosphere at Pearl Roundabout. Yet there 
is little evidence of coerced participation. Social 
demands and criticism of corruption included in the 
manifesto received lively support from the crowd, 
while statements reaching out to Pearl Roundabout – 
such as the demand to release all political prisoners – 
were actually booed. If anything, the crowd appeared 
to expect a more confrontational stance from the 
emerging Sunni leadership. Certain accounts also 
suggest that increasingly confrontational and sec-
tarian rhetoric at Pearl Roundabout alienated some 
(Sunni) activists enough to lead them to defect to 
the counter-movement.24 
The regime’s preference was clear, however. Secu-
rity forces and official media that had been mostly 
hostile to the Pearl Roundabout movement (and at 
best neutral) gave massive support to the counter-
movement. Footage of plain-clothes thugs operating 
alongside police during the sectarian violence in 
March 2011 reinforces the impression that certain 
forces within the regime intended to escalate the 
situation until a political solution became impossible, 
at the same time as others were negotiating with 
the opposition to find exactly such a solution. Many 
observers attribute this contradiction to fundamental 
conflicts between rival currents within the royal 
power structure: the interests of regime hardliners – 
motivated by ideological anti-Shiite dispositions and 
concern to hold on to power – coincided with those of 
the organizers of the Al-Fateh movement, who feared 
a deal between the palace and the Shiite parties at 
their expense.25 External influence, in particular 
Saudi Arabia’s concerns about a possible spread of the 
movement beyond Bahrain and increased Iranian 
leverage, finally tilted the balance to the side of the 
hardliners. 
After the mid-March crackdown, official media 
dropped any pretense of neutrality, and joined a full-
blown sectarian witch hunt. Collaboration with Iran 
or simply “treason” became the blanket accusation, 
sectarian hate speech was welcomed on TV, and a 
wave of demolitions targeted ostensibly “unlicensed” 
Shiite mosques and community centers. In turn, some 
opposition platforms associate the Bahraini regime or 
24  Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf (see note 14), 68. 
25  Gengler, “Royal Factionalism” (see note 11). 
even Sunni Bahrainis in general with Al-Qaeda. Shiite 
religious references and sometimes violent protest in 
Shiite areas again became the trademark of the oppo-
sition. Each side uses material produced by the other 
to portray its opponents as sectarian, divisive, and 
beholden to external forces, in contrast to their own 
purported inclusiveness and patriotism. Both thus 
collaborate, if from a vantage point of vastly unequal 
power, in generating exactly the sectarian polariza-
tion they ostensibly denounce. 
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 Iraq 2011/2013 
 
Youth protests against poor services, corruption, 
and heavy-handed policing had been simmering in 
southern Iraqi cities such as al-Kut and Basra since 
mid-2010, and increased in intensity after the long-
awaited formation of a government at the end of the 
year failed to bring any improvement. Events in Tuni-
sia and Egypt encouraged their spread to other parts 
of the country, and activists in various cities increas-
ingly coordinated their activities and messages.26 
The authorities responded with carrot and stick. 
While affirming the right to demonstrate and offer-
ing handouts and promises, Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki issued warnings about terrorist attacks and 
potential violence. Deployment of riot police predicta-
bly triggered such violence in several locations, while 
on February 20 a nascent protest camp in Baghdad’s 
own Tahrir Square was attacked by thugs, after secu-
rity forces were withdrawn for unexplained reasons.27 
In response, online activists and a broad alliance of 
civil society organizations announced a “Day of Rage” 
for Friday, February 25. Harsh security measures and 
a virtual lockdown of downtown Baghdad restricted 
participation to a few thousand, while tight restric-
tions on the few media outlets willing to cover the 
event minimized public exposure. Despite (or in fact 
because of) the heavy security presence, there were 
more violence and casualties. Continuous violent 
repression, including arbitrary detention and threats 
of murder and rape, succeeded in whittling down 
the protest.28 At the end of June, al-Maliki mobilized 
thousands of supporters from the southern provinces 
for far larger counter-demonstrations. Around the 
same time, some of the protest organizers entered into 
26  For a first-hand account of the 2011 events, see Saad 
Salloum, Beneath the Liberation Monument All That Is Solid 
Vanishes into Air (2012), http://www.lb.boell.org/web/52-771. 
html. Further background information was obtained from 
interviews with Salloum (May 2013) and activist Haidar 
Haidar (April 2013). 
27  Kholoud Ramzi, “Protesters Attacked in Dawn Raid,” 
niqash, February 24, 2011, http://www.niqash.org/articles/ 
?id=2789. 
28  Amnesty International, Days of Rage: Protests and Repression 
in Iraq, April 2011, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ 
MDE14/013/2011/en/991fffba-1762-43d1-8b4f-1555eb568d17/ 
mde140132011en.pdf. 
separate talks with government representatives, 
causing the movement to split and ultimately falter. 
New protests erupted in late 2012, this time re-
stricted to the Sunni-dominated part of the coun-
try. While partly framed in the language of social 
demands and human rights (such as the release of 
female detainees allegedly subjected to systematic 
sexual abuse), the main demand was redress for the 
alleged marginalization of Sunni Iraqis by a govern-
ment dominated by Shiite parties, and support for 
Sunni politicians ousted by al-Maliki.29 On April 23, 
2013, government forces killed 50 protesters and 
injured 110 in Huwaija near Kirkuk (which had also 
seen significant protests in 2011),30 leading to the 
militarization of the movement and a further deterio-
ration of sectarian relations expressed in a new cycle 
of deadly terrorist attacks. Almost a year on, repeated 
military attacks against “protest camps” in the west-
ern provinces and the reappearance of Al-Qaeda are 
conspiring to plunge the area and all of Iraq into a 
new maelstrom of sectarian conflict.31 
Sectarianism and Political Conflict in Iraq 
Center versus periphery and tribal versus urban 
power bases were the dominant cleavages in indepen-
dent Iraq. Most of the south only turned to Shiism in 
the nineteenth century, when Ottoman policies of 
enforced settlement of nomadic tribes and an ill-con-
ceived land reform caused social upheaval.32 In other 
words, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
29  Abdallah Otaibi, “Iraqi Protests Take on Sectarian Tone,” 
Al-Hayat (Arabic), January 2013, English version at http://www. 
al-monitor.com/pulse/tr/contents/articles/politics/2013/01/ 
iraqi-protests-take-on-sectarian-tone.html. 
30  International Crisis Group, Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and 
the State, Middle East Report 144, 32, http://www.crisisgroup. 
org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq 
%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/144-make-or-break-iraq-s-sunnis-
and-the-state.pdf. 
31  Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “The Anbar 
Protests Crisis: Calculations of the Parties Involved,” February 
13, 2014, http://english.dohainstitute.org/release/156d3718-
7762-446d-bbe6-43a8646437eb. 
32  Yitzhak Nakash, Shi’is of Iraq (Princeton, 1994), chapter 1. 
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Sectarianism and Political Conflict in Iraq 
many Iraqis were Shiites because they were poor 
and marginalized, not the other way around. Urban 
Shiites, on the other hand, thrived on the economic 
boom that came with the start of oil extraction. 
Both the state, wielding the classical tools of nation-
building – education and mass media – and the politi-
cal opposition – in particular, the once powerful Iraqi 
Communist Party – saw to it that Arab Iraqis would 
identify themselves not in sectarian terms, but first 
and foremost as Iraqis, or as members of a particular 
social class. Proposals for federalism, let alone dis-
mantling the shared state, never gained significant 
traction among Arab Iraqis.33 
Saddam Hussein, who today epitomizes Shiite vic-
timization, embraced bigotism towards Iraqi Shiites 
only towards the end of his reign, but even then the 
issue was power rather than sectarian prejudice. Con-
versely, the reason that Sunnis from the northwest 
like himself dominated the commanding heights of 
power throughout his reign was “because they are the 
friends and kin of those already there, rather than 
because they attend the same mosque.”34 As scores of 
leading officials were purged, unquestioning loyalty 
became the key to survival, and solidarity of extended 
families and clans the basic principle of power.35 
Under Saddam, politicized Shiite Islam remained 
the only challenger after all other political competi-
tors had been destroyed. Harassment and persecution 
of the main Shiite party, Dawa, were combined with 
a strategy of co-opting Shiite institutions and expres-
sions of religiosity into the Iraqi nationalist narrative 
of the ruling Baath party. A fictitious genealogy trac-
ing Saddam Hussein back to Imam Hussein was even 
created.36 The Dawa party’s defection to Iran during 
the 1980–1988 war allowed the regime to portray it as 
unpatriotic, and the loyalty of the Shiite population 
was courted by stressing the Arab essence of Islam, in 
contrast to Iranian “imposters.” The majority of Shiite 
Iraqis fought loyally for their country, but when 
Saddam’s brinkmanship led to humiliating defeat 
33  Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions 
of Unity (London and New York, 2011). 
34  Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “Some Reflec-
tions on the Sunni/Shi’ Question in Iraq,” Bulletin of the British 
Society for Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 2 (1978): 84. 
35  Amatzia Baram, “Saddam’s Power Structure: The Tikritis 
before, during and after the War,” Adelphi Papers 43, no. 354 
(2003): 93–113. 
36  Amatzia Baram, “Re-Inventing Nationalism in Ba’thi Iraq 
1968–1994,” in Challenges to Democracy in the Middle East, ed. 
William Harris (Princeton, 1997), 37. 
by the US-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, enraged 
soldiers turned their wrath against the Baath, and 
were joined by the local population.37 Since the south-
ern provinces bordering Kuwait are mostly Shiite, so 
were those who participated in the uprising. The up-
rising quickly acquired a Shiite coloring, and for the 
Republican Guard, recruited overwhelmingly from 
the Sunni north-west, the conclusion was clear: “No 
Shiites after today”.38 Utmost violence against the in-
surrection was followed by a decade of ever-growing 
anti-Shiite bias, leading to repeated bouts of violence 
and uprisings. 
Regime change in 2003 could have offered an 
opportunity to open a new page and establish equal 
access to political representation for all Arab Iraqis.39 
Polls conducted at the time indicated that only a 
minority of Iraqi citizens wanted politics to be organ-
ized along sectarian lines.40 Likewise, massive demon-
strations against the occupation attracted support 
from Sunnis and Shiites alike.41 Yet nearly all parties 
that entered the political process had a clear sectarian 
profile.42 For its part, the exiled Iraqi opposition had 
already applied the principle of explicit sectarian and 
ethnic quotas in the structures of the Iraqi National 
Council established during the early 1990s.43 
Saddam’s massacres against Kurds and Shiites had 
convinced policymakers in the United States and its 
allies that the problem in Iraq was first and foremost 
sectarian and ethnic, and that the most straightfor-
ward solution would be a formalized structure of 
equitable power-sharing between the groups. 
Accordingly, in 2003 the Iraqi Governing Council was 
formed according to an ethno-sectarian key, setting a 
37  Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq (see note 33), 65–86. 
38  Kanan Makiye, “The Arab Spring Started in Iraq,” New York 
Times, April 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/ 
opinion/sunday/the-arab-spring-started-in-iraq.html. 
39  Since the Kurdish region was well-established by 2003, 
including its own security forces, and allied with the United 
States, Kurdish autonomy was never seriously challenged. 
40  Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: 
The Occupation and Its Legacy (London, 2006), 148. 
41  Khalil Othman, “Trans-sectarian Moral Protest against 
Occupation: A Case Study of Iraq,” in Democratic Transition in 
the Middle East, ed. Larbi Sadiki, Heiko Wimmen, and Layla 
Al-Zubaidi (London and New York, 2013), 42–65. 
42  With the partial exception of the Iraqi National Accord 
(INA) headed by Iyad Allawi; however, his alleged links to 
the CIA and harsh handling of the Fallujah uprising quickly 
undermined his appeal to Sunni Iraqis. 
43  Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing 
the Peace (New Haven and London, 2007), 53. 
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Iraq 2011/2013 
precedent for politics during the occupation period.44 
On the local level, the systematic destruction of any 
form of independent politics or civil society by the old 
regime had left religiously based networks as the most 
easily available matrix for the creation of political 
communities, and the collapse of the Iraqi state in the 
aftermath of the war only compounded the problem. 
The security vacuum, further compounded by the dis-
solution of the Iraqi army, was then filled by local 
and hence mono-sectarian militias. 
Organizing representation along sectarian lines 
meant that Sunni Arab Iraqis, accounting for only 
20 percent of the population (as opposed to some 60 
percent for the Shiites), felt increasingly marginalized. 
The extremely violent repression of the restive town 
of Fallujah and the Shiite clergy’s open intervention 
for the unified Shiite list in the 2005 elections “crystal-
lized growing concerns among Sunnis that the dice 
were loaded against them.”45 Sunni political actors 
responded with boycott and obstruction,46 further 
diminishing their own share of power and amplifying 
their community’s sense of marginalization, which 
in turn fuelled the insurgency that erupted in 2006. 
A combination of counter-insurgency and coopta-
tion allowed Iraqi and occupation forces to defeat in-
surgents and militias by 2008, and bring representa-
tives of the Sunni population back into the fold. Elec-
tions in 2010 yielded a plurality for the Iraqiyya 
alliance composed of Sunni, secular, and non-Islamist 
Shiite politicians and again underlined the existence 
of a constituency for non-sectarian political approach-
es in Iraqi society. However, internal divisions and 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s acumen in out-
maneuvering opponents quickly undermined the 
new force.47 
44  David Gairdner, Risk and Violence in Iraq’s New Sectarian 
Balance, NOREF report (September 2012), http://www.isn. 
ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id= 
153598. For details about Iraq’s power-sharing arrangements, 
see Nussaibah Younis, “Set up to Fail: Consociational Political 
Structures in Post-war Iraq, 2003–2010,” Contemporary Arab 
Affairs 4, no. 1 (2011): 1–18. 
45  Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq (see note 43), 340. 
46  Sunni leaders achieved a near-total boycott of the Nation-
al Assembly elections in early 2005, and were consequently 
mostly excluded from the constitution-writing process. They 
campaigned, and only narrowly failed, to defeat the new 
constitution in the referendum held six months later. See 
Toby Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (London, 
2012), 45. 
47  International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Secular Opposition: The Rise 
and Decline of Al-Iraqiya, Middle East Report 127 (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
Sectarianism in the 2011 Mobilizations 
The wave of protests that peaked in February 2011 
had originally started in the Shiite-majority south, 
and had no sectarian dimension whatsoever. Rather, 
they were directed against all political parties within 
the ruling power structure, of which Nouri al-Maliki, 
a Shiite, happened to be the most prominent and 
powerful representative. As they evolved, and im-
promptu networks of youths were joined by more ex-
perienced civil society activists, they acquired explicit-
ly anti-sectarian messages. Corruption in particular 
was linked to politicians’ control over sectarian appor-
tionment, and sectarian conflict attributed to their 
strategies of divide and rule. One of the most wide-
spread protest signs (besides a sea of Iraqi flags) was a 
red card in the shape of a map of Iraq, alongside many 
banners proclaiming a “united country.” Likewise, the 
movement appropriated reference points of national – 
that is, Sunni-Shia – unity, such as the uprising against 
the British in 1920. 
Tahrir (“Liberation”) Square, the physical location 
of the protests, likewise carried a strong symbolic 
meaning beyond its obvious allusions to the Egyptian 
precedent and to the shared struggle against British 
colonialism. While the 2006–2008 violence divided 
Baghdad into nearly exclusively Sunni and Shiite 
sectors, the area around Tahrir Square is one of the 
few still identified with cosmopolitan urbanity. It 
therefore signifies a sphere of social interaction 
secured by a sense of civility rather than militarized 
security, in contrast to the “Green Zone” directly 
across the river, where government institutions are 
located and most politicians live. While the orienta-
tions of many protestors mirrored this character of 
the location, a significant section also hailed from 
religious and conservative backgrounds. For these, 
mixed (Sunni-Shiite) prayers were organized in the 
adjacent park, which on normal days serves as a 
retreat for drunks, thus again underlining the claim 
that the movement could serve as a model for public 
responsibility and coexistence alike.48 Participants 
emphasized these claims by symbolic actions, such as 
displaying brooms to express their determination to 
clean up not only the public space around them, but 
also the “filth” of official politics. 
africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iraq/127-iraqs-secular-opposition-the-rise-
and-decline-of-al-iraqiya.aspx. 
48  Interview with Salloum. On the following, see Salloum 
(2012, see note 26). 
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From Iraqi Spring to Sunni Spring 
The prime minister’s warnings of violence had the 
potential to destroy this atmosphere of mutual trust 
and civility. They initially failed to do so, mostly 
because protestors driven by deep disdain for politi-
cians were especially unlikely to take heed, but also 
because the organizers were determined to keep the 
movement peaceful in order to maintain the moral 
high ground and deny the security forces any pretext 
for a violent crackdown. Any individual or group dis-
playing provocative behavior was quickly surrounded 
and neutralized, and on several occasions activists in 
white headbands formed a human barrier between 
riot police and protestors seeking confrontation. 
The measures to prevent violence and maintain a 
cross-sectarian discourse and appeal worked, partly 
due to the presence and determination of an experi-
enced core group of organizers and activists, many 
with a background in formal civil society, but also 
because participation never exceeded a few thousand. 
But the limited numbers set very narrow limits on 
what the movement could actually achieve. With elec-
tions barely a year past and all major political parties 
joined in a “grand coalition,” as is typical for power-
sharing systems, mass mobilization would have been 
necessary to credibly challenge the legitimacy of the 
political sphere. Yet with nearly all political parties – 
which also control most of the Iraqi media – and all 
the clergy – Sunni and Shiite – aligned against it, such 
mass mobilization was impossible. Its lack of allies in 
formal politics also deprived the movement of crucial 
protection from state violence and left it with few 
practical options as to how and in particular by whom 
the reforms it demanded were to be implemented. On 
the other hand, the propaganda of fear worked well 
in support of the counter-mobilizations that finally 
broke the back of the protests in the early summer of 
2011. 
From Iraqi Spring to Sunni Spring 
The protests that began in late 2012 in the overwhelm-
ingly Sunni northwest over the arrest of the bodyguards 
of (Sunni) Minister of Finance Rafi al-Issawi were clear-
ly directed against alleged Sunni marginalization and 
the perceived sectarian agenda of the al-Maliki govern-
ment. Yet their demands initially focused on concrete 
legal and institutional remedies, included issues relat-
ing to social and human rights, such as the situation 
of female political prisoners, remained peaceful and 
explicitly renounced sectarianism.49 Activists who had 
participated in the 2011 movement expressed quali-
fied sympathy for the movement,50 and even paid 
solidarity visits to the area, but expressed doubts con-
cerning the motives and agendas of some of the 
leaders. 
The latter included local clerics, tribal leaders, and 
affiliates of the Iraqi Islamic Party (an offshoot of the 
Muslim Brotherhood) but also Baathists and former 
anti-occupation resistance fighters with contact to 
jihadi groups.51 Thus, this new movement was not on-
ly from the outset almost exclusively Sunni, but bore 
the potential to take a violent sectarian turn. The 
violent attack on the Hawija protest camp on April 
23, 2013, by government troops seen as “Shiite” units, 
firmly tilted the balance in that direction. In response, 
the movement started to militarize, and social media 
pages that had been used to organize the 2011 pro-
tests filled with sectarian hate speech. The escalation 
of sectarian conflict across the border in Syria further 
exacerbated those tendencies, and created a growing 
influx of weapons and jihadi fighters. The parallel 
surge in attacks on Shiite neighborhoods, mosques, 
and markets served to dissuade Shiite Iraqis from 
granting the movement the benefit of the doubt, and 
removed whatever cross-sectarian appeal its demands 
could have had. 
 
 
49  Ali Issa, “Tipping Towards Iraq’s Squares: An Interview 
with Falah Alwan,” Jadaliyya, January 22, 2013, http://www. 
jadaliyya.com/pages/index/9699/tipping-towards-iraqs-
squares_an-interview-with-fa. 
50  Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, Iraqi Civil Society 
Organizations: “Escalating Political Conflict among Leaders of 
the Major Blocks Endangers the Unity of Iraqi Society and Reflects 
Negatively on Civil Peace”, January 30, 2013, http://www. 
iraqicivilsociety.org/archives/1089; Interviews with Salloum, 
Haidar. 
51  International Crisis Group, Make or Break: Iraq’s Sunnis and 
the State (see note 30), 16–22. 
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 Lebanon 2005/2011 
 
When Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak resigned 
on February 12, 2011, Lebanese online forums were 
already abuzz with calls for mobilization under the 
slogan “the people demand the fall of the sectarian 
regime.” Circulated by a mix of young first-timers, 
experienced civil society activists, and supporters 
of non-sectarian parties, these virtual debates soon 
yielded a first march of some 2,000 on February 27. 
Participation in the Sunday demonstrations peaked 
at around 20,000 on March 20, and for slightly more 
than a month, a conscious focus on social issues main-
tained an image of “national unity” and non-partisan-
ship. However, the movement was eventually ulti-
mately unable to avoid, still less bridge the major 
divides of Lebanese politics, nor to insulate itself 
against the climate of sectarian animosity and fear 
fueled by the conflict in neighboring Syria. By early 
summer 2011, internal conflict turned acrimonious 
and most of the unaffiliated participants withdrew, 
leaving the movement to fizzle out. 
Eight years earlier, Lebanon had already experi-
enced a massive popular movement that some observ-
ers at the time believed to be a harbinger of things 
to come for the region.52 The assassination of former 
Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri on February 14, 2005, 
galvanized political opposition against the Syrian-
controlled Lebanese regime, and following a massive 
turnout for his funeral on February 16, plans for popu-
lar mobilization were discussed. Established politi-
cians were, however, quickly overtaken by activists, 
some hailing from their own student organizations,53 
52  Samir Kassir, “Beirut, Spring of the Arabs,” An-Nahar, 
March 4, 2005, http://samirkassirfoundation.org/documents/ 
articles/Pr000553.doc. 
53  Youth organizations moved on the initiative of individ-
ual mostly university-based leaders who did not wait for their 
party headquarters to devise a strategy. Some, like the very 
active supporters of General Michel Aoun (still exiled at the 
time), were not even part of a formal party structure. Party 
leaderships initially failed to grasp the political potential 
of the downtown camp, and therefore left “their” activists 
largely to their own devices. See Christian Gahre, Staging the 
Lebanese Nation (Master Thesis, Beirut, 2007); Rayan Majed, 
L’engagement politique des étudiants dans l’Intifada de l’Indépen-
dance (Master Thesis, Beirut, 2007); André Sleiman, Le Camp de 
la Liberté, plate-forme de la révolution souverainiste de 2005, Annales 
and large numbers of politically unaffiliated citizens, 
who started pitching tents on Beirut’s downtown 
Martyrs’ Square on the evening of February 18. Over 
the following ten months, the camp continued to 
grow, as did the demonstrations converging on the 
square, with a first peak on February 28 when a parlia-
mentary debate about the assassination was sched-
uled. That day, several thousand protesters peacefully 
defied the ban on demonstrations imposed by the 
Ministry of the Interior, which the army and the secu-
rity forces declined to enforce. With his authority 
undermined and facing withering attacks on his gov-
ernment, Prime Minister Omar Karami announced 
his resignation in a speech that was televised live and 
shown on a giant screen in Martyrs’ Square,54 thus 
creating a sense of victory that boosted the protesters’ 
enthusiasm. International pressure, in particular from 
the United States, finally convinced the Syrian regime 
and its Lebanese allies that their situation was unten-
able, and on March 7 Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad 
announced the withdrawal of Syrian forces. 
But the battle had just begun. Only 24 hours later, 
Hizbullah gathered its own supporters downtown for 
a pro-Syrian rally that dwarfed all former demonstra-
tions.55 On March 14, in response, the opposition 
upped the ante, now relying fully on the financial and 
logistic resources of the Hariri family and its political 
allies to achieve perhaps double the turnout of the 
week before. Meanwhile, the power of the “Freedom 
Camp” to generate political momentum and popular 
legitimacy had become apparent to the political 
parties. The initial free-wheeling initiative of student 
activists was replaced by increasingly rigid top-down 
control, and attempts by some of the unaffiliated 
de sociologie et d’anthropologie 18–19 (Université Saint-
Joseph, Beirut, 2007–2008), 121–160. 
54  Footage is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
VXa0Yk98OXg&noredirect=1 (Arabic). 
55  During his speech, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah 
explicitly asserted an equally, if not more valid popular legiti-
macy for his political line: “I ask the world and our fellow 
countrymen: Are these hundreds of thousands mere mario-
nettes?” For the relevant passage of the address, see https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ojJuMnbATXw&noredirect=1 
(Arabic). 
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Sect and State 
activists to convert the structures established in the 
camp into a permanent civic movement were sup-
pressed.56 
The demonstrations of March 8 and 14 – which 
gave the names to today’s rival political camps – estab-
lished fundamentally opposing views on Syria’s role 
in Lebanon, but also reflected sharp differences on 
Lebanon’s regional orientations and alliances. While 
March 14 urged neutrality in regional conflicts and 
turned to the West and the Gulf monarchies for sup-
port, March 8 pushed for militant “resistance” against 
the United States and Israel alongside Iran and Syria. 
For about a year, the main political actors nevertheless 
maintained a modicum of cooperation in a shared 
government, but the Israel-Hizbullah War of 2006 
pushed the differences to the fore.57 By the end of 
2006, March 8 had withdrawn its ministers and initi-
ated an 18-month downtown “sit-in” that amounted 
to a lock-down of government. Finally, on May 7, 
2008, Hizbullah mobilized its powerful armed wing, 
crushed the nascent and poorly organized pro-govern-
ment militias (as both the army and the security forces 
watched on), and imposed terms that granted it an 
effective veto over any government decision. Sectarian 
tensions between Sunnis and Shiites have festered 
ever since. For many of the anti-sectarian activists that 
took to the streets in early 2011, real fear of civil strife 
was an important part of their motivation. 
Sect and State 
Sectarian representation has been a defining feature 
of Lebanon since the mid-nineteenth century, with 
local actors, Ottoman rulers, and European powers all 
working to establish the sect as the defining category 
for the relationship between the populace and the 
state.58 This process was determined by sequences 
of interaction between domestic social and political 
conflict on one side, and regional and international 
strategic interests on the other. As long as Lebanese 
56  Sleiman, Le Camp de la Liberté (see note 53), 160. 
57  While the conflict was politically divisive, it generated 
a remarkable momentum of cross-sectarian solidarity and 
popular pride in Hizbullah’s performance, which the politi-
cal actors chose to not capitalize upon. 
58  Ussama Makdessi, The Culture of Sectarianism (Berkeley, 
2000). For a detailed analysis of the roots of the conflicts in 
nineteenth-century Lebanon see Samir Khalaf, Civil and Uncivil 
Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Commu-
nal Conflict (New York, 2002). 
political actors were left to their own devices, they 
would forge shifting cross-sectarian alliances to 
achieve favorable outcomes in their perennial strug-
gles over power and resources. When regional conflict 
arose, sectarian rifts served as entry points for external 
powers to sway the strategically located country to 
their side. On the back of their support, radical actors 
increasingly eclipsed moderates, and compromise 
became impossible. 
Thus the Lebanese Civil War of 1975–1990 erupted 
amidst US-Soviet competition in the region and on the 
heels of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. It pitted 
(mostly Muslim) groups pushing for social equality, 
support for the Palestinian cause, and a correction of 
the power-sharing formula, who were supported by 
the Eastern Bloc, against (mostly Christian) opponents 
who were defending the status quo, arguing neutrality 
in regional conflict, and seeking alignment with the 
West. However, the conflict quickly turned Lebanon 
into a theater for proxy warfare, with the interests of 
external actors overriding those of their local clients, 
that only came to an end when the Soviet empire col-
lapsed and the outcome of the 1991 Gulf war appeared 
to spell stable US regional hegemony.59 
Rather than compromise and reconciliation, the 
post-war order was built on militia leaders assuming 
positions of power in the political institutions, with 
Syria acting as a feared enforcer. Resources were 
allotted according to sectarian quota and the bargain-
ing power of sectarian leaders. Ordinary Lebanese 
would thus identify personal opportunities with the 
political fortunes of these leaders. Their mere pres-
ence, as well as their perennial jostling for power and 
resources, also kept alive memories of past conflict 
and fears of new violence. Behind a façade of pretend 
national reconciliation and ritualistic condemnations 
of sectarianism, the 1990s were a decade of sectarian 
fear and loathing.60 Furthermore, parties were not 
invited on equal terms. Acceptance of Syrian domina-
tion was a non-negotiable condition, leading to exile 
and imprisonment for the main Christian leaders and 
the destruction of their parties. Beyond the injury of 
59  For a detailed account of the war and its background, see 
Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State 
and Rise of a Nation (London, 1993). 
60  Opinion polls indicate that the intensity of sectarian atti-
tudes had already increased significantly by 2002, several 
years before the onset of the current confrontation. See Theo-
dor Hanf, E pluribus unum? Lebanese Opinions and Attitudes on 
Coexistence (Beirut: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2007), http:// 
library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/beirut/04985.pdf. 
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2BLebanon 2005/2011 
losing political privileges through the revised power-
sharing formula, Lebanese Christians suffered the 
insult of being “represented” by leaders they loathed 
as Syrian stooges. 
Sect, Resistance, and the 2005 Uprising 
Syria’s heavy hand however also created the possibility 
that Lebanese from different sectarian backgrounds 
would overcome their differences and join forces 
against the occupiers. The 2005 assassination of for-
mer Prime Minister Hariri offered the occasion to 
forge these tendencies into a shared political platform. 
Resistance against Syria was transformed from a divi-
sive issue propagated by the (mostly Christian) losers 
of the civil war into a common cause which temporar-
ily allowed the Lebanese to suspend sectarian rivalry 
and fear. 
Martyrs’ Square was the ideal stage for this par-
ticular narrative of national unity. Beyond the highly 
visible location in the city center and near the main 
political institutions, its location on the former civil 
war front line – abutting the Christian area to the 
east, and the Muslim one to the west – made it a per-
fect meeting point. Those gathering there imagined 
themselves in highly emotional terms (and were por-
trayed this way by the media and by PR professionals 
contributing their skills to the cause) as a people re-
uniting and re-establishing a sovereign political com-
munity through a genuine bottom-up movement, as 
opposed to the pretend reconciliation built on foreign 
domination that had been the hallmark of the 1990s. 
Furthermore, the notion of a nation united in cross-
sectarian solidarity against foreign domination unfail-
ingly summoned the “foundational myth” of Lebanese 
independence, the common struggle against French 
colonialism in the 1940s.61 One of the central events 
of the huge demonstration on March 14 was indeed a 
reiteration of sovereignty in the form of a pledge for 
Christian and Muslim Lebanese to stay together for 
better or worse, read out by the (later assassinated) 
politician and publisher Gibran Tueni. With its 
ecstatic enactments of national, cross-sectarian 
harmony and unity, the Martyrs’ Square movement 
thus mobilized a political resource that enabled an 
especially powerful claim to popular sovereignty, 
while at the same time removing the last shreds of 
61  Hanna Ziadeh, Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-
building in Lebanon (London, 2006), chapter 5. 
legitimacy from the divisive and foreign-controlled 
official institutions nearby. 
Yet not everybody felt equally invited. Observers 
soon noted the conspicuously low participation of 
Shiite Lebanese. More precisely, Lebanese close to 
Hizbullah (mostly but not exclusively Shiites) from 
day one considered the Hariri assassination an Israeli 
false-flag operation designed to discredit Syria,62 and 
regarded the events in Martyrs’ Square as American 
machinations. Yet for nearly three weeks, the party 
watched from the sidelines. 
The reaction in Martyrs’ Square was initially denial. 
Individual Shiite participants would be paraded to 
demonstrate that the impression was simply wrong; 
confidence was expressed that the rest would join 
soon enough. After Hizbullah finally showed its stance 
on March 8, denial turned into aggression, and anti-
Shiite rhetoric gained a currency that drove even a 
considerable number of non-Shiite activists away in 
disgust. Among Shiites themselves, only those un-
equivocally opposed to Hizbullah or affiliated with 
ostensibly non-sectarian groups (such as the Demo-
cratic Left or the nationalist movement of exiled 
General Michel Aoun) remained. March 8 raised the 
stakes, and the masses that flooded downtown Beirut 
on that day challenged the Lebanese opposition’s 
claim of national unity. The latter responded in kind, 
relying on the full scope of sectarian solidarity and 
clientelist networks at the disposal of the Hariri family 
and its allies to generate a turnout that would under-
line political claims through numerical rather than 
moral superiority. With all other sectarian communi-
ties lined up against the Shiites at that point, they 
eventually succeeded.63 Within less than a month, the 
youth movement had fallen under the full control 
of sectarian political actors once again donning the 
mantle of Lebanese patriotism, and cross-communal 
mobilization deteriorated into a sectarian headcount 
62  Interviews conducted by the author in residential quar-
ters supportive of Hizbullah, February 2005. Shiite youths 
in these areas who somewhat distanced themselves from 
the party line expressed sympathy for the anti-Syrian agenda, 
citing competition by cheap Syrian labor. Those who did 
participate in the demonstrations reported overhearing 
invective against Shiites, in particular by Hariri supporters 
hailing from lower middle class Sunni quarters, well before 
the March 8 demonstration. 
63  Propaganda from both sides inflated participation to 
numbers that the actual physical locations could have never 
accommodated (supposedly, one million on March 8 and 1.5 
million on March 14), but rendered the relative proportions 
more or less accurately. 
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2011: Beirut Spring Reloaded 
faithfully reflecting the demographic composition of 
the country. 
2011: Beirut Spring Reloaded 
In early 2011, discontent with a political class pre-
occupied with factional interests came together with 
enthusiasm for the apparent successes of the move-
ments in Egypt and Tunisia. Since that excitement cut 
across the sectarian and political frontlines that had 
divided the Lebanese since 2005, the activists organiz-
ing these protests believed that popular mobilization 
around demands for social justice, more inclusive 
politics, and resistance against an abusive political 
class may succeed in breaking down or tempering the 
sectarian divisions that most of these activists viewed 
as tools of domination generated by politicians to 
further their own ends.64 
Yet the prominent involvement of activists affiliat-
ed with ostensibly secular or non-sectarian political 
parties – namely, the Lebanese Communist Party 
(LCP) and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP)65 – 
rendered the relationship to the “sectarian political 
system” that the movement vowed to overthrow 
inherently ambiguous.66 While the ideological plat-
forms of these two parties are indeed non- or even 
anti-sectarian, they do engage in strategic alliances 
with parties that have an unequivocally sectarian 
profile, and advocate political positions that many 
Lebanese consider to belong to sectarian agendas. 
Looking for strong state actors to further its vision of 
a nation-state spanning the Fertile Crescent,67 the 
Lebanese chapter of the SSNP has for decades been a 
loyal client of the Baathist Syrian regime and after 
2005 a faithful ally for Hizbullah (including direct 
support during the 2008 clashes), a course rewarded 
with cabinet posts and advantageous electoral al-
64  Interview with activist Basil Saleh, September 2011. 
65  Activists claim that supporters of these parties already 
dominated the first meetings of the nascent movement 
through their superior political experience. Interview with 
activist Ali Noureddine, September 2011. 
66  Basim Sheet, “The Movement for the Fall of the Sectar-
ian System and Its Symbols,” Permanent Revolution, no. 1/2012, 
http://permanentrevolution-journal.org/ar/issue1/anti-
sectarianism-movement-lebanon-lessons (Arabic). 
67  The term “Syria” in the party’s name refers to an area 
stretching from the shore of the eastern Mediterranean to 
the Persian/Arabian Gulf, and a nationalist vision based on 
geography and shared cultural history that would accommo-
date different creeds, ethnicities, and languages. 
liances. Anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism likewise 
led the LCP into a tacit alliance with Hizbullah despite 
ideological and historical animosities.68 Almost from 
the beginning, party supporters who lionized “resist-
ance” against Israel and the United States as the para-
mount national cause that all of society should rally 
around argued with activists who rejected the notion 
that Hizbullah deserved special status for leading the 
“resistance.” Thus, when some activists pushed for 
more explicit attacks on the political class – denounc-
ing specific politicians by name as representatives of 
the “sectarian regime” that was to be overthrown – 
long battles ensued. They ended in an uneasy com-
promise: while the list included the top leaders of 
nearly all relevant sectarian parties, Hizbullah was 
represented only by the leader of its parliamentary 
group, leaving Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah 
as the central icon of “resistance” untouched. 
Such equivocation could not escape the practiced 
attentiveness of the Lebanese media and public for 
hidden sectarian and partisan agendas, and soon 
enough the movement was portrayed, in particular 
by media sympathetic to March 14, as a thinly veiled 
propaganda effort by March 8. Public support from 
Nabih Berri, a politician with an especially notorious 
reputation for exploiting the (Shiite) sectarian public 
employment quota for clientelist purposes, further 
entrenched this perception. It also enforced the wide-
spread notion that the demand for an end to the 
sectarian political system (i.e. abolishing sectarian 
quotas, veto rights etc.) is nothing more than a code 
word for (Shiite) majoritarianism.69 
Internal differences finally turned acrimonious as 
the conflict in neighboring Syria escalated. Many of 
the independent activists expressed solidarity with, 
even enthusiasm for the Syrian movement, and con-
sidered it part of a shared struggle against repressive 
governments across the Arab world. They were dis-
mayed to find that many fellow activists translated 
their support of Hizbullah’s resistance agenda into 
support for the Syrian regime.70 The increasing identi-
68  Many communists blame Hizbullah for the assassination 
of leftist intellectuals in the late 1980s, and accuse the party 
of monopolizing resistance against the Israeli occupation by 
actively sabotaging operations launched by the leftist Leba-
nese National Resistance Front. 
69  The exact demographic balance is uncertain, but the pre-
cise size of the Shiite community remains a cause of anxiety, 
in particular among Sunni Lebanese who fear for their share 
of sectarian quota. 
70  Interview with activist Rima Ibrahim, September 2011. 
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fication of the Syrian uprising with Sunni Islamist 
extremism (with links to political actors in Lebanon) 
circulated by media and on social networks sympa-
thetic to March 8 worked to instill fear among non-
Sunni independent activists. Caught between party 
strategists coopting the mobilization and fellow activ-
ists succumbing to sectarian fears, the independents 
among the initiators of the campaign for “the over-
throw of the sectarian system” quickly lost the capac-
ity to maintain a cross-sectarian message that would 
include Lebanese across the sectarian and partisan 
divides. 
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In late January 2011, small groups of activists began 
holding vigils in downtown Damascus over social 
issues and in support of the unfolding Egyptian revo-
lution. They were harassed and dispersed by thugs, 
and calls for a “Day of Rage” on February 4 circulated 
on social media but went without a notable response.71 
Some of the more seasoned opposition activists went 
public with expressions of skepticism, pointing out 
that the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt had built 
on years of groundwork that had been impossible in 
Syria.72 Before 2011, ostensibly non-political social and 
cultural activities had provided nearly the only outlet 
for dissent in Syria. Closely monitored by the ubiqui-
tous security services and occasionally targeted by 
repression, this “lateral civil society”73 of leftist, liberal, 
and secular persuasion enjoyed a narrow margin of 
tolerance as long as it remained below a fluctuating 
but always very low ceiling of institutionalization and 
public presence.74 
Protest originating from these urban, elite-based 
networks of dissidents became more audacious in the 
following weeks, peaking in a demonstration for the 
release of political prisoners in front of the Ministry 
of the Interior on March 16, but failed to achieve the 
momentum of mass participation. Instead, the first 
major protest occurred on February 17 in the popular 
Damascene neighborhood of Hariqa after an alterca-
71  “Q&A: Syrian Activist Suhair Atassi,” Aljazeera, February 
9, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/2011/02/ 
201129135657367367.html. 
72  Ammar Abdulhamid, “Syria Is Not Ready for an Uprising,” 
Guardian, February 7, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2011/feb/07/syria-uprising-egypt-tunisia-days-
of-rage. 
73  This term was proposed to the author in 2007 by a Syrian 
intellectual striving to stake out a sphere of “independent” 
public activity protected by reform-minded regime actors. 
Quite a few of these “lateral” activists later played active roles 
during the first phase of the uprising. 
74  Most NGOs were forced under the umbrella of the Syria 
Trust for Development established under the patronage of 
First Lady Asma Al-Assad. Salam Kawakibi, Civil Society Against 
All Odds, Hivos Knowledge Programme Civil Society in West Asia, 
April 2013, http://www.hivos.net/content/download/100237/ 
867726/file/Special%20Bulletin%202-Salam%20Kawakibi%20_ 
6-5-13.pdf. 
tion between a local resident and traffic police,75 fol-
lowed by demonstrations in the southern town of 
Deraa, where the arrest and abuse of school children 
for writing “revolutionary” graffiti fueled popular 
anger against an already resented local governor.76 
Distributed through foreign-based but locally-fed net-
works of digital activists, the images of the violence 
against the population of Deraa resonated and trig-
gered protests across the country. Mostly organized by 
small, spontaneously formed cells of young activists 
with next to no political experience, over the first three 
months these mostly peaceful protests were frequent 
but mostly small and organized at short notice, in 
order to evade the increasingly harsh security response. 
In June 2011, the withdrawal of security forces from 
Syria’s fourth-biggest city Hama opened a space for 
massively growing protests that took over the city for 
nearly a month.77 In Damascus and Aleppo however, 
the movement remained confined to the suburbs, 
while counter-demonstrations supporting the regime 
were staged in the center of both cities. As the security 
clampdown intensified during the sum mer of 2011, 
non-violent protest gradually gave way to armed 
struggle. With the establishment of the Free Syrian 
Army in late July, despite repeated international at-
tempts at mediation (amongst others by Kofi Annan), 
the country was set on a track straight to civil war. 
Sect, Power, and Violence 
Alawis make up some 10 percent of the Syrian popu-
lation but dominate the military and the all-powerful 
security sector.78 Their prominence goes back to the 
75  Al-Quds Al-Arabi, February 18, 2013. An English summary 
including video footage is available at http://syriaintransition. 
com/2011/02/18/move-you-donkey-sparked-17-feb-damascus-
demo/. 
76  Hugh Macleod, “Inside Deraa,” Aljazeera, April 19, 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/ 
201141918352728300.html. 
77  Nour Ali, “Hama – The City That’s Defying Assad,” 
Guardian, August 1, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2011/aug/01/hama-syrian-city-defying-assad. 
78  80 percent of officers are said to be Alawis, and there are 
accounts of non-Alawi officers experiencing difficulty assert-
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Syria 
recruitment preferences of the French colonial 
administration, but acquired its current shape only 
through the decade of coups and counter-coups 
that finally brought Hafez Al-Assad (the father of the 
current president) to power in 1970.79 
Like to their ideological twin in neighboring Iraq, 
the ruling Syrian Baathists found that ties of sect, 
clan, and family ultimately trumped all other sources 
of solidarity when it came to consolidating power. 
The recruitment policies of the regime reflected this 
experience, stacking the ranks of the army, the secu-
rity services, and special forces with loyal allies, most-
ly if not exclusively from the Alawi community. To 
block potential contenders from within (Assad had 
himself ousted a fellow Alawi to seize power, and 
faced off his own brother a decade later), different 
Alawi clans were balanced against each other, and 
non-Alawi officers inserted in positions where they 
would obstruct the creation of autonomous Alawi-
controlled networks without being able to create net-
works on their own. Recruitment into the army and 
security sector also provided an avenue of social ad-
vancement for the historically marginalized commu-
nity.80 
At the same time, Assad senior wooed back parts 
of the predominantly Sunni urban merchant class 
that his leftist predecessors had alienated, and allo-
cated positions of power to individuals with tradition-
al authority and social capital in the regions. Through 
the far-flung structures of the Baath Party, provincial 
elites of all sects could achieve access to the center of 
power and resources that translated into loyalty to 
both themselves and the regime, while always remain-
ing under the watchful eye of security officials who 
would most often be Alawi. At the apex of this struc-
ture of patronage and control, all relations of loyalty 
and privilege ultimately led to an intertwined net-
work of power connecting the extended Assad family, 
ing authority over Alawis they nominally outrank. See Reva 
Bhalla, Making Sense of the Syrian Crisis, http://www.stratfor. 
com/weekly/20110504-making-sense-syrian-crisis. 
79  On this section see Volker Perthes, The Political Economy of 
Syria under Asad (London, 1997); Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: 
Revolution from Above (London and New York, 2004). 
80  According to a prevalent discourse in the Syrian opposi-
tion, the Assad regime intentionally refrained from develop-
ing the Alawite core areas in the northwest so that members 
of the community would continue to migrate to the cities 
and seek employment in the public or security sector, thus 
becoming dependent clients of the regime. See Christa Sala-
mandra, “Sectarianism in Syria: Anthropological Reflections,” 
Middle East Critique 22, no. 3 (2013): 303–306. 
the security services, and the Syrian business commu-
nity.81 
The violent conflict between the regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood between 1976 and 1982 both 
proved the effectiveness of these strategies and en-
trenched their use. Despite its appeal to religious, 
social, and indeed sectarian prejudice against the 
heretic rural upstarts, the Brotherhood failed to break 
the web of mutual interest spun by the Assads. Thus, 
significant parts of the Sunni countryside as well as 
the urban merchant class of Damascus remained aloof 
from the uprising, or even sided with the regime. 
The conflict, and in particular the Hama massacre 
of 1982, established an economy of fear that the regime 
carefully managed to restore and maintain its base of 
social support. The Islamists’ targeting of Alawis with 
no direct links to the regime and fears of future retri-
bution created a collective threat perception that 
equated any return of Islamism with impending geno-
cide.82 Other minorities were sometimes courted by 
means of preferential treatment, and were content to 
see the Islamists kept at bay. Islamism also remained 
a concern for Sunnis oriented towards a moderately 
westernized lifestyle, or any Syrian fearing a return to 
civil strife. 
Beyond proving the importance of keeping the secu-
rity sector in Alawi hands, the confrontation of the 
1980s also provided it with ever wider, indeed lethal 
powers. Hence the perception that any Alawi, in any 
position, would be capable of mobilizing powerful 
connections and getting the better of adversaries and 
competitors gained even greater currency. While not 
always accurate,83 these perceptions imprinted them-
81  A visualization of the current makeup of this power 
structure is available at http://www.washingtoninstitute. 
org/uploads/Maps/Syria-Regime-Chart-20130826. See also 
Samer Abboud, Syria’s Business Elite between Political Alignment 
and Hedging Their Bets, SWP Comments 22/2013 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2013), http://www. 
swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-paper-detail/ 
article/syrias_business_elite.html. For an insightful analysis 
of the regionalization of power in Baathist Syria see Kheder 
Khaddour and Kevin Mazur, The Struggle for Syria’s Regions, 
Middle East Report 269 (winter 2013), http://www.merip.org/ 
mer/mer269/struggle-syrias-regions. 
82  Khaddour and Mazur (see note 81) relate the example of 
a security officer who registered his daughter in the pre-
dominantly Sunni Damascene neighborhood of Midan, rather 
than his hometown Tartous, so that her ID card would not 
give away her Alawi background in the event of future vio-
lent conflict. 
83  There are pronounced differences between regions: most 
high-ranking Alawi members of the security services hail 
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Sectarianism in the Syrian Uprising 
selves upon the public reputation of Alawis in general, 
creating further reason to fear political change even 
among those who did not partake in any privilege or 
crime, but were concerned that new rulers might not 
bother to establish the difference. To some extent, 
this logic rubbed off onto members of other minority 
communities (Christians, Druze, Ismailis, Shiites, 
Circassians) who were seen as preferred clients of the 
regime, and feared retribution by association.84 
Sectarianism in the Syrian Uprising 
Deraa and the Hawran area, where the uprising began 
in earnest, are predominantly populated by Sunni 
Arabs but traditionally known for unwavering loyalty 
to the regime; they produced more than their fair 
share of party and state officials,85 and did not support 
the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1976–82 conflict. 
However, economic reforms introduced since the early 
2000s had created considerable social discontent in 
provincial towns. Thus, when local notables who ap-
proached government and security officials to settle 
the issue of the arrested youths were treated with dis-
dain, pent-up anger and embitterment exploded into 
open rebellion. The initial protests in mid-March did 
not target the sectarian character of the regime, but 
the arbitrary rule of the local governor (whose resi-
dence was torched) and rampant corruption, per-
sonified in particular by the president’s cousin Rami 
Makhlouf (the offices of mobile phone company 
Syriatel, controlled by Makhlouf, were vandalized).86 
from the coast and the coastal mountains, while many Alawi 
residents of the central plain around Homs feel treated as 
second-rate members of the community. See Aziz Nakkash, 
The Alawite Dilemma in Homs: Survival, Solidarity and the Making 
of a Community, (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, March 
2013), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09825.pdf. 
84  During the early 1990s, such fears were expressed to the 
author by many Syrian Christians, while members of Muslim 
minority communities reported encountering the same kind 
of resentment as was directed against Alawis. 
85  For example, Vice-President Farouk al-Sharaa, Prime 
Minister Wael al-Halaqi, Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal 
al-Mekdad, Information Minister Omran al-Zoghbi, and the 
late prime minister Mahmoud al-Zoghbi. See Tareq al-Abd, 
“Tribalism and the Syrian Crisis,” As-Safir, January 18, 2013, 
English at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/01/ 
tribalism-clans-syria.html#ixzz2jxuNdLn1. 
86  On the following see Mohammed Jamal Barout, The Last 
Decade of Syrian History, part 5-5-1 (Arabic), (Center for Research 
and Policy Studies), http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/ 
e84a713e-6da3-43d3-99c3-c68f25a4954a, 13, 20–23, 31. 
Mosques provided the most readily available space 
to congregate, and potential sanctuary when a crack-
down occurred. In Deraa, the historical Omari Mosque 
quickly became a center of the uprising, including a 
field hospital, and was consequently stormed by gov-
ernment forces on March 23, with a death toll of five. 
The storming of this particular place of Sunni worship 
(dedicated to the revered Caliph Omar bin al-Khattab) 
instantly invested the conflict in Deraa with a strongly 
sectarian dimension, in particular since the operation 
was rumored to be the work of Alawi shock troops 
under the direct command of Maher Al-Assad, the 
president’s enigmatic brother. Influential religious 
figures in the Salafi and Sufi religious milieus, who 
had until this moment urged their followers to stay 
away from protests, reversed their position. 
Unlike Deraa, some of the towns that rose up in 
response (such as Baniyas, Latakia, Homs) had mixed 
populations of Alawis and Sunnis. On March 25, 
Latakia teetered on the brink of disaster, as armed 
groups (said to be members of smuggling rings related 
to a member of the Assad family) descended from 
the mountains to support the local Alawi community 
against the perceived threat, and unidentified indi-
viduals appeared in Alawi and Sunni quarters alike 
warning the residents of impending attack. Tradition-
al leaders from both communities cooperated with 
the local authorities, and the situation was contained. 
On March 27, government spokeswoman Buthaina 
Shaaban poured oil on the fire, claiming that a “sec-
tarian plot” against Syria was unfolding,87 and Presi-
dent Bashar Al-Assad’s speech in parliament three days 
later again emphasized this line.88 Sectarian incidents 
in Baniyas, Jibla, and Homs followed in quick succes-
sion, and with spiraling levels of violence (including 
the first videos of sectarian killers parading and des-
ecrating corpses of victims) that traditional leaders – 
including Sunnis who still stood with the regime – 
could no longer control.89 
87  “Casualties in Syria, and Accusations That the Target Is 
the Regime,” Aljazeera, March 27, 2011, http://www.aljazeera. 
net/news/pages/750e8e7a-35ab-4811-8c0d-6620195799f0 
(Arabic). 
88  Footage of the speech is available at http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=97iMoKAxfwQ (Arabic). Barout (The Last Decade 
of Syrian History [see note 86], part 5-5-1, 33) counts seventeen 
mentions of the expression “sectarian strife” during the speech. 
89  Barout, The Last Decade of Syrian History (see note 86), part 
5-5-2, http://www.dohainstitute.org/file/Get/4ff91646-1920-
41f6-92cc-4f04664405b5, 9f. 
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Syria 
With incidents like these, and the highest levels 
of leadership and pro-government media fanning the 
flames, the considerable efforts of many activists to ex-
press trans-sectarian solidarity and all-Syrian national-
ism, in particular after the president’s speech, could 
only slow down but not prevent the slide into open 
sectarian conflict. Mounting casualties initiated a 
cycle whereby public religious rituals of burial and 
mourning became occasions for further protest and 
mobilization, leading to further casualties. This steadi-
ly expanded the prominence of religious vocabulary 
and modes of expression among the protestors over 
the following weeks. Calls for jihad, martyrdom, and 
the wearing of burial shrouds (demonstrating that the 
bearer is prepared to die for the cause) first occurred 
in Baniyas in early April and then spread to Homs.90 
Not only did these expressions feed into the regime’s 
efforts to portray the movement as controlled by 
Islamist radicals, they also served to increasingly alien-
ate members of non-Sunni communities who had 
initially supported the movement and participated in 
anti-regime demonstrations.91 The protest technique 
of nightly takbir – whole urban quarters shouting 
“God is Great” (Allahu Akbar) from the rooftops – bor-
rowed from the 2009 Iranian Green Movement per-
haps served the purpose of creating a sense of solidari-
ty and collective empowerment, but also struck terror 
in the non-Sunni communities.92 
On the regime’s side, paramilitary structures – the 
feared shabiha militias, so-called popular committees, 
and the “Popular Army” – recruited along sectarian 
lines, the preferential use of Alawi-dominated army 
units and special forces,93 collective retribution and 
massacres amounting to sectarian cleansing, and the 
participation of foreign fighters with a distinctive 
Shiite profile (the Lebanese Hizbullah, the Iranian 
Al-Quds force) all served to convince many – though 
by no means all – Sunni Syrians that this was first and 
foremost a sectarian conflict targeting their religious 
community. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Nakkash, The Alawite Dilemma in Homs (see note 83), 13. 
92  Personal communications reported by SWP researcher 
Petra Becker. During the early phase of the uprising, activists 
were in direct contact with Iranian activists advising them 
on protest tactics and strategies. Personal communications, 
summer 2011. 
93  Nakkash, The Alawite Dilemma in Homs (see note 83); Joseph 
Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency To Civil War 
(Institute for the Study of War, March 2013), 10, http://www. 
understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime. 
In the course of nearly three years of conflict, exile 
and violent death have depleted the ranks of the initial, 
inclusion-minded protest leaders, while the increasing 
prominence of radical Islamists within the armed 
insurrection has given it a clear sectarian imprint, 
creating a sense that the regime might be the lesser 
of two evils even among many Syrians with little sym-
pathy for the Assad family. According to the opposi-
tion’s narrative, this was the objective all along. The 
release of militant Islamists from jail, placement of 
artillery next to Shiite or Christian places of worship 
to draw retaliatory fire, the use of Alawi militias to 
subdue restive quarters overwhelmingly inhabited by 
Sunnis,94 and many more pieces of evidence are cited 
to argue that the regime was following a conscious 
and cynical strategy of turning civic contestation into 
sectarian conflict to prevent the wave of solidarity 
with the victims of state violence that had fueled up-
risings elsewhere, and scared Alawis and other minor-
ities, as well as secular Sunnis, into clinging to the 
regime. 
On the other side, throughout the conflict the 
regime has consistently asserted a secular Syrian 
nationalism and cast itself as the only genuine pro-
ponent of multi-sectarian coexistence. With sufficient 
internal cohesion and control over the media, the 
regime was able to keep its representatives on this 
message, suppress evidence of sectarian practices in-
cluding massacres, and parade Christian and Sunni 
clerics to vouch for its inclusiveness. In turn, lack of 
leadership and formal structures made it impossible 
for the opposition to distance itself from extremist 
voices, allowing the regime to portray the whole 
movement as dominated by Islamist extremists.95 
Whether or not the Syrian regime and its counter-
insurgency strategy relied on a conscious and delib-
erate strategy of instigating sectarian conflict, the 
speed with which the communities were set against 
one another can only be explained by the ingrained 
fear of the sectarian other, sown by the violent conflict 
94  Nakkash, The Alawite Dilemma in Homs (see note 83), 9f. 
95  Defecting Syrian soldiers report that during the first 
weeks of the crisis, orders described the protestors as “gangs 
of terrorists” sent or manipulated by external conspirators 
linked to Saudi Arabia, and that contacts to the outside world 
(including relatives) were circumscribed and media access 
strictly monitored so as to avoid any contradictory informa-
tion reaching them. See Human Rights Watch, “By All Means 
Necessary.” Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes 
against Humanity in Syria (December 2011), http://www.hrw. 
org/sites/default/files/reports/syria1211webwcover_0.pdf. 
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Sectarianism in the Syrian Uprising 
of the 1980s and nurtured by the regime’s practices 
over the three decades since. Even the most meticu-
lously planned and implemented strategy could not 
have conjured such fear and venom out of thin air: 
memory of past atrocities and enduring injustice 
provided a highly combustible fuel, and only a small 
measure of initial violence was required to set it 
ablaze. 
The Syrian opposition was unable to prevent this 
slide. One problem was that for the younger genera-
tion of activists, the magnitude of the problem only 
became apparent as it unfolded. At the time, many 
held the sincere belief that the overwhelming urge to 
be delivered from oppression would easily overcome 
sectarian divisions which they often saw (or repre-
sented) as irrelevant (many claim that until 2011 they 
had been unaware of the sectarian identity of many 
acquaintances and colleagues), and that minority fears 
could easily be overcome by emphatic expressions of 
all-Syrian solidarity.96 Among the older generation of 
dissidents who knew better, the issue was often denied 
and wished away, by some well past the point where 
the surge of sectarianism was plain to see, and fre-
quently paired with adamant refusals to even discuss 
the issue. Token appointments of Kurds, Christians, 
and Alawis to the Syrian National Council and later 
the Syrian Opposition Coalition, and rhetorical com-
mitments to national unity and a “civil state” did little 
to alleviate concerns,97 and have been described by 
some critics as a mirror-image of the regime’s own 
approach.98 The claim is of course not that a pro-active 
approach to the question of sectarianism – starting by 
acknowledging the problem in the first place – could 
have allowed Syrian intellectuals and oppositionist 
to stem or significantly slow the slide into sectarian 
conflict. Rather, the observation is that sectarianism 
ingrained through long-term authoritarian practice 
provided the Syrian regime with tools that enabled it 
96  Interviews with exiled Syrian activists, Beirut (October 
2012, April 2013), Cairo (October 2013). 
97  As Akram Al-Bunni points out (in The Syrian Revolution and 
Future of Minorities, Arab Reform Brief [April 2013], 6f., http:// 
www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/ARB_67_Syria_A.Al-
Bunni_April13_Final_Layout_En.pdf), such verbal commit-
ments often had the ring of tactical expediency, and did not 
contribute to the credibility of the opposition.  
98  Research interviews with opposition activists Maan Abdel-
salam (October 2011), Salam Kawakibi (July 2013). Salaman-
dra (“Sectarianism in Syria” [see note 80], 305) neatly captures 
the inability of Syrian dissidents to extricate themselves from 
the logic of sectarianism with the expression “avowed athe-
ists hurl sectarian accusations against each other.” 
to confine protest and mobilization to one part of 
society, and frighten other parts of society – that 
extend way beyond the sectarian group most closely 
identified with it – into extending their support and 
condoning, indeed participating in practices that 
would have been impossible elsewhere, while at the 
same time presenting the uprising and its tentative 
leaders with dilemmas they were unable to overcome. 
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 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The popular movements in 2011 in Bahrain, Iraq, and 
Syria, and in 2005 and 2011 in Lebanon, all mobilized 
on a platform of national unity. Since each of these 
societies had suffered destructive sectarian conflict in 
its recent past, these were really narratives of national 
reconciliation in and through the struggle against 
oppressive rule. Rather than defenders of national sov-
ereignty and unity, regimes and established political 
actors were cast as the origin of factional strife. Remov-
ing them would thus eliminate the need to protect 
sectarian groups from one another, and with it a ma-
jor source of legitimacy for these actors. 
The power of this narrative was most compelling in 
Lebanon in 2005, for the simple reason that an actual, 
if superficial, reconciliation of historical rivals – the 
Sunni Muslim and Christian communities – took place 
and walls of fear were dismantled at the popular level. 
Beirut’s Martyrs’ Square between February 18 and 
March 14, 2005, provides yet another example of the 
transformative potential of collective action, and of 
the resources generated by the transgression of social 
boundaries that are invested with strong emotions 
(existential fear, memories of violence). These move-
ments also demonstrate the special relevance of public 
space in divided societies, as in three of the four cases 
a highly visible but “neutral” location was an impor-
tant factor in the narrative of national reconciliation. 
In contrast, the huge demonstrations that took over 
the Syrian city of Hama in July 2011 did not serve this 
purpose, despite significant participation from minor-
ity communities, because Hama was perceived as 
a Sunni city. Demonstrations of such magnitude in 
downtown Damascus would have changed the equa-
tion fundamentally; instead the regime claimed these 
spaces for its own loyalist marches. 
This points to the crucial predicament that affected 
all these movements: their inclusive agendas and dis-
courses did not convince everybody in equal measure. 
Where mass participation occurred, a large majority 
of at least one sectarian group remained aloof, or 
sided with the regime. Participation by certain indi-
viduals from these groups – often, if not exclusively, 
drawn from their social elites – initially served to 
maintain the inclusive narrative. Yet hopes that their 
presence would attract larger segments of these groups 
were shattered when these instead joined counter-
mobilizations, and supported or even participated in 
violent repression. 
Some of the reasons for these failures can be attri-
buted to the make-up of these movements themselves. 
Lack of central and hierarchical leadership was a 
serious liability. Ad-hoc structures achieved some con-
trol over banners and public statements, but radical 
and indeed sectarian voices still managed to exploit 
the opening, and were soon enough picked up by hos-
tile (traditional and new) media eager to expose the 
“real” (sectarian) agenda. These voices became domi-
nant as repression turned violent and casualties 
mounted. Whereas a coherent organization with a 
clearly defined leadership might have been able to 
control or convincingly disown such outliers, a move-
ment speaking with many tongues could not. More-
over, innovative and creative forms of public action 
were always accompanied by protest repertoires 
steeped in religious imagery. This was only natural in 
societies were religious practice constitutes a central 
element of everyday life and one of the few spaces 
of limited autonomy. But since religiously inspired 
repertoires and places of worship revealed sectarian 
affiliations, they also identified the movements with 
sectarian groups, again raising doubts about the sin-
cerity of their inclusive discourse. 
Political parties, while initially wrong-footed, 
quickly joined the fray in Bahrain and Lebanon, and 
played a highly ambivalent role. On the one hand, 
they clearly pushed up the numbers. On the other, the 
highly visible participation of political parties iden-
tified with particular sects, or platforms perceived as 
sectarian, again undermined the inclusive appeal, 
even when these parties marched under non-partisan 
banners and worked actively to build cross-sectarian 
alliances. In Syria, the prominent role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the external opposition created the 
same effect, despite the organization’s efforts to pep-
per its discourse with affirmations of democratic prin-
ciples. In contrast, the 2011 movement in Iraq rejected 
any participation by parties that were part of the rul-
ing power structure. This still did not prevent Shiite 
parties and clerics from slandering it as a front for 
Baathists and Al-Qaeda, while depriving it of allies that 
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could have offered protection and bargaining power 
vis-à-vis state actors. Sunni politicians in turn instru-
mentalized a movement in north-western Iraq in 
2013 for their power struggle with Baghdad, setting 
the country back on a course to sectarian violence. In 
Lebanon, sectarian political parties either opposed 
the Martyrs’ Square movement or exploited it for their 
own ends, thus destroying any potential for a cross-
sectarian alternative. 
All these handicaps prevented the narrative of 
national reconciliation from realizing its full poten-
tial. To be transformed by collective action in a way 
that brings down walls of fear and generates cross-
cleavage solidarity, individuals and groups from both 
sides of the divide need to actually encounter each 
other face to face and practice solidarity in direct 
action, rather than in rhetorical statements. Hence the 
importance of physical spaces not inscribed with any 
particular sectarian meaning, where groups could 
meet on equal terms. But even during the initial phase 
when inclusive messages were clearly dominant and 
established political parties less visible, not enough 
people from both sides of the divide were attracted to 
turn the narrative of national unity and reconciliation 
from a claim into a self-sustaining reality. 
The challenged regimes exploited these weaknesses 
efficiently. Just like their counterparts in Tunisia and 
Egypt, the rulers of Bahrain, Iraq, and Syria and politi-
cal actors in Lebanon deployed the propaganda tools 
at their disposal to discredit opposition movements as 
dominated by or doing the bidding of Islamist radicals 
in the service of either Saudi Arabia or Iran. Just as in 
Tunisia and Egypt, the purpose of this fear propagan-
da was generating domestic support and international 
acquiescence for violence and repression. Yet in soci-
eties that are divided along sectarian lines, identifying 
popular movements with extremist Islamist organi-
zations also means that those parts of the population 
who buy into this discourse will identify the threat 
scenario thus created with one particular sect (Sunnis 
in Iraq and Syria, Shiites in Bahrain, both in Lebanon 
depending on the political camp). In combination 
with memories of past discrimination and violence, 
recent regional examples of sectarian conflict, and the 
described weaknesses of the movements themselves, 
these arguments succeeded in spreading enough fear 
to undermine the narrative of national unity and 
reconciliation. 
Use of violence and the radicalization and counter-
violence that inevitably followed then made the propa-
ganda ring true, or even turned it into actual truth. 
The transformative power of collective action turned 
negative: Participants who had originally accepted 
the inclusive narrative changed their perception and 
withdrew, or even joined counter-movements, which 
then initiated intercommunal violence. Arguably, 
(regime) violence in Egypt in 2011 failed to stem the 
protests because it created common grievances that 
brought people together, while in the societies dis-
cussed here violence recalled old and created new 
sectarian grievances that drove people apart. 
To sum up: Events in 2011 clearly show that divided 
societies harbor a potential for pro-democracy mobili-
zations that cut across the dominant cleavage lines, 
and thus bestow a form of bottom-up legitimacy that 
challenges established rulers and political leaders. The 
latter either attempted to hijack and exploit these 
movements, or tarred the narrative of national unity 
and reconciliation as a camouflaged sectarian agenda. 
Such counter-discourses did not rely on falsification 
and propaganda alone. Rather, they successfully ex-
ploited a number of structural weaknesses inherent 
in these movements. Converting protest movements 
with a cross-sectarian outreach into sectarian confron-
tations was not only a result of skillful manipulation 
from above. Rather, “once sectarianism has become a 
viable way of tarnishing the image of political adver-
saries, it moves to all levels of society and becomes 
as much a bottom-up as a top-down process.”99 While 
leaders certainly worked hard and in some cases 
applied brute force to herd their wayward flocks back 
into sectarian corrals, the quick and resounding suc-
cess of these efforts relied on dispositions and dynam-
ics already present in these societies. 
A historical perspective shows that in all four cases, 
these dispositions and dynamics are grounded in 
authoritarian, non-democratic, and violent practices 
of rule, leadership, and power maintenance applied by 
or on behalf of political rulers and leaders. Whether 
the narrative features Druze landlords in nineteenth-
century Lebanon mobilizing tribal solidarity to com-
bat an agrarian uprising, Syrian intelligence officers 
recruiting Alawi youths into popular militias, Sunni 
Iraqi politicians generating bargaining power by initi-
ating “spontaneous” protest camps, or Bahraini royals 
encouraging Sunni citizens to take to the streets to 
prevent a Shiite takeover: the story remains one of en-
forced top-down solidarity sustained by and ultimately 
99  Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf (see note 14), 10. 
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leading to violence, which compromises all social 
actors and destroys all options for horizontal soli-
darity that could generate bottom-up pressure. As 
the events of 2011 and beyond show, divided societies 
remain divided and indeed become more so as the 
result of strategies and practices devised by rulers and 
leaders defending positions of political power, and for 
this same end, they will continue to generate exactly 
the divisions and the violence they pretend to contain. 
Recommendations 
Based on the above, the most obvious lesson for Euro-
pean policymakers should be that concerns about 
ethnic or sectarian strife are no reason to acquiesce 
to or support authoritarian rule. Authoritarian rulers 
may temporarily suppress such conflicts, but will ulti-
mately resort to exploiting and mobilizing them when 
seriously challenged, thus adding yet another chapter 
to a history of internecine violence that is in turn liable 
to generate more violence. In divided societies, today’s 
authoritarian stability begets tomorrow’s civil war, or 
even genocide. 
External promotion of more democratic and partic-
ipatory forms of rule is of course by nature unlikely to 
find a welcome among authoritarian rulers, whether 
they preside over a homogenous or a divided society. 
But in the latter case, it is also liable to alienate those 
groups in society who (are led to) believe that democ-
ratization will allow the numerically strongest and/or 
most cohesive group(s) to dominate state institutions, 
and hence monopolize benefits, impose social values, 
and exact retribution for past marginalization. Authori-
tarian rulers and sectarian leaders have proven adept 
at nurturing such fears and converting them into a 
rejection of democracy as such. 
Rather than operating with normative concepts of 
democracy and governance, or standard blueprints for 
state-building, external actors seeking to contribute 
to long-term solutions that will address rather than 
suppress the potential for conflict inherent in divided 
societies therefore will have to seek out and strength-
en potentials for cross-cleavage solidarity and partici-
patory governance that exist in these societies. The 
events of 2011 have thrown these potentials into stark 
relief, along with the forces and dynamics that are 
likely to stand in their way. 
Liberal civil society, ranging from institutionalized 
associations and NGOs to informal groups of activists, 
remains the core support base for democratic govern-
ance and non-sectarian notions of citizenship. In 2011 
(and in 2005 in Lebanon), the political experience and 
intellectual input of individuals and networks created 
around such groups represented critical contributions 
to the initially inclusive discourse of the movements 
and their capacity to create a narrative with cross-
sectarian attraction. Any support provided for such 
groups is a valuable investment in the future of these 
societies, even if the immediate impact may not be 
visible. At the same time, it is important to not over-
burden and then subsequently judge and dismiss such 
actors on the basis of unrealistic expectations. While 
the experience of common struggle in civil society may 
inculcate cross-sectarian orientations in some individ-
uals, such groups do not have the capacity on their 
own to “knit the society together across ethnic lines 
and undermine divisive ethnic politics”,100 as expected 
by some strands of the peace-building literature.101 
Rather, where these groups achieved a significant 
impact in terms of popular mobilization, this resulted 
to a significant extent from cooperation with or paral-
lel efforts by leaders and structures of solidarity or 
deference constituted by religion, sect, locality, tribal 
allegiance, and other forms of non-elective communi-
ty, who were nevertheless prepared to subscribe to 
the narrative of national unity and reconciliation. 
Attempts to build cross-cleavage solidarity and politi-
cal platforms need to engage with such actors and 
harness the influence and moral authority they wield. 
Beyond mobilizing for inclusive platforms, they may 
also help to prevent radicalization and hinder attempts 
to create counter-movements, even though this capac-
ity finds its limits where and when excessive violence 
occurs. 
A similar observation applies to political parties, 
which often organize and mobilize according to the 
100  Bruce Hemmer, The Democratization of Peace Building: 
The Political Engagement of Peacebuilding NGOs in Democratizing 
Societies (PhD Thesis, Irvine, 2009), 61. 
101  An often-cited study proposing a direct relation between 
cross-cleavage civil society networks and successful conflict 
prevention is Ashutosh Varshney’s Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: 
Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven, 2003). Evidence that 
such expectations influenced the American state-building ef-
fort in Iraq can be found in Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: 
The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy 
to Iraq (New York: Owl Books, 2007). For a nuanced account 
see Thania Paffenholz and Christoph Spurk, Civil Society, Civic 
Engagement, and Peacebuilding, Social Development Papers (New 
York: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit of the 
World Bank, 2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTCPR/ 
Resources/WP36_web.pdf. 
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Recommendations 
same logic of communal allegiance and representa-
tion. Restricting cooperation to parties with an osten-
sibly secular, cross-cleavage approach ignores the fact 
that including such language in platforms and mem-
bership in international organizations of political 
parties – such as the Socialist and the Liberal Inter-
national – is often but a thin veneer for the fact that 
these parties represent a single sectarian community. 
On the other hand, parties that are clearly identifiable 
as communal representatives (such as the Lebanese 
Hizbullah, the Iraqi Sadr Movement, the Bahraini 
Wifaq, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood) have on many 
occasions adopted inclusive discourses. They need to 
be engaged and encouraged to make good on such de-
clared intentions, since their influence on the ground 
means that no solution is possible without their sup-
port. 
Finally, processes geared to addressing these con-
flicts in ways that balance the quest for participation 
with fears of marginalization have been initiated by 
political actors and international mediators in all 
countries discussed except for Syria, where attempts 
at finding a political solution still face huge difficul-
ties.102 However, these processes and the common plat-
forms they created were abandoned as local actors 
working against compromise found support from 
regional powers (in particular Saudi Arabia and Iran) 
that turned these countries into theaters for their 
own strategic rivalry. Once external actors can be con-
vinced or compelled to contribute to resolving rather 
than escalating, internationally sponsored processes 
of national understanding should revisit these plat-
forms and adopt roadmaps that are formally binding 
for domestic and external actors alike, and imple-
mented with the help of international institutions. 
In Bahrain, the National Charter proposed in 2001 
by the current king found resounding popular sup-
port back then, and was echoed by the opposition’s 
Manama Document of October 2011.103 Despite this, 
the “National Dialogue” initiated during the 2011 
events has remained stillborn.104 What appears to be 
102  Muriel Asseburg and Heiko Wimmen, Geneva II – A Chance 
to Contain the Syrian Civil War, SWP Comments 10/2014 (Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2014), http:// 
www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-comments-en/swp-
aktuelle-details/article/geneva_ii_a_chance_to_contain_the_ 
syrian_civil_war.html. 
103  http://www.bahrainjdm.org/2011/10/13/manama-
document-english/. 
104  Guido Steinberg, Kein Frühling in Bahrain: Politischer Still-
stand ist die Ursache für anhaltende Unruhen, SWP-Aktuell 23/2013 
sorely missing is the political will of the ruling dynasty, 
or, according to some accounts, the capacity of its 
reform-minded members to prevail over bigoted rela-
tives who are aligned with powerful economic inter-
ests. European countries, in particular the United 
Kingdom, should use their considerable influence to 
stiffen the resolve of the reformist faction. 
Rather than building on the agreement reached in 
the Kurdish regional capital Erbil in November 2010 
in order to address the main structural flaws of the 
post-2003 political order, in Iraq sectarianism has been 
used as a political weapon to maximize influence and 
marginalize opponents.105 While Prime Minister Nouri 
al-Maliki has proved most adept in these techniques, 
the recent violence in western Iraq demonstrates that 
further concentrating institutional power is unlikely 
to yield stability, and liable to be self-destructive. On 
the other hand, a significant proportion of the Iraq’s 
Arab population has consistently supported inclusive 
approaches based on non-sectarian Iraqi nationalism, 
even in the face of egregious sectarian violence. Apart 
from the 2011 Tahrir movement, recent expressions 
of such preferences include the success of the Iraqiyya 
coalition in the 2010 elections, and even al-Maliki’s 
own electoral victory in the 2008 provincial elec-
tions.106 What Iraq needs is a process of national dia-
logue that puts the fundamental understanding 
achieved in Erbil to the Iraqi public, and develops this 
into a formula that reconciles the commitment to a 
unified Iraqi state with solid guarantees against future 
victimization. Crucially, rather than being restricted 
to small circles of political actors – arguably, one of 
the major flaws of the post-2003 political process – 
this process must be open and transparent to the Iraqi 
public, thus allowing for effective electoral account-
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2013), 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/publikationen/swp-aktuell-
de/swp-aktuell-detail/article/politischer_stillstand_in_ 
bahrain.html. 
105  The exact content of the agreement is disputed. See 
International Crisis Group, Déjà vu All Over Again? Iraq’s Esca-
lating Political Crisis, Middle East Report 176 (July 30 2012), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20
North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/126-deja-vu-
all-over-again-iraqs-escalating-political-crisis.pdf, in particular 
note 6. A partial English translation is available at http:// 
www.easyenglish4u.com/erbil-agreement-s-19-points.  
106  Major Shiite leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Ammar 
Al-Hakim have in recent months adopted a discourse that 
appears to be catering to this voting potential. See Mustafa 
Habib, “The Next Leader of Iraq? Former Extremist and Islam-
ic Cleric the Most Likely Candidates,” Niqash, November 7, 
2013, http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3322. 
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ability. It must also include all actors with real legiti-
macy on the ground – in particular, tribal leaders 
in the northwest, whose support is needed to win 
the war against Islamist extremism – as well as their 
regional sponsors, in particular Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. Europeans should attempt to build on the recent 
positive momentum in relations with Iran to initiate a 
process that leads to an internationally sponsored Iraq 
conference. Convincing Iran’s clients in Iraq to reverse 
their exclusionary course and open up to substantial 
participation by the Sunni part of the population 
may also serve to convince Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
countries that improved relations with Tehran will 
lead to regional stabilization rather than Iranian 
hegemony. 
Until 2005, Syrian strategies of divide and rule pre-
vented the implementation of the roadmap to abolish 
political sectarianism included in Lebanon’s “Document 
of National Understanding” (the Taif accord); the en-
tanglement of local actors in regional conflicts and 
the resulting deep polarization have proved equally 
debilitating since, and the “National Dialogue” estab-
lished in 2006 (with active European support) has gone 
nowhere. No solution will be possible until regional 
tensions, and in particular the civil war in neighbor-
ing Syria, are brought under control. In the meantime, 
the performance of the Lebanese Army will be crucial 
to save Lebanon from sliding into the Syrian abyss and 
exploding into sectarian conflict. Besides mediating 
between the two political camps to help prevent vio-
lence, external actors should offer direct material 
assistance to the armed forces.107 
At the same time, commitment to the Taif accord 
and to coexistence in a (religiously and politically) 
pluralist society cuts across all segments of the Leba-
nese population. No political actor, not even Hiz-
bullah, pursues an agenda designed to marginalize 
others on a sectarian basis. On the popular level, con-
stituencies that are potentially susceptible to sectarian 
hate propaganda do exist in communities that lack 
coherent leadership, as is the case for the Lebanese 
Sunnis. Yet even these radical tendencies are mostly 
fueled by discourses of sectarian fear, and will recede 
once the objective reasons for such fear abate. Taif also 
includes elements designed to reduce sectarian threat 
perceptions through more rather than less democracy 
107  Heiko Wimmen, Lebanon’s Slow-Motion Self-Destruction, SWP 
Comments 21/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
August 2013), http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publications/swp-
comments-en/swp-aktuelle-details/article/libanons_langsame_ 
selbstzerstoerung.html. 
(decentralization, additional safeguards, and avenues 
of redress against the abuse of power), which may be 
further expanded. Once regional tensions recede and 
politics again becomes a matter of Lebanese affairs 
rather than conducting the conflicts of others, the 
road ahead is clearly laid out in the Taif document. Its 
final implementation will require precisely the kind 
of resourceful bargaining and acumen for imperfect 
yet workable compromise that Lebanese politicians – 
indeed, Lebanese from all walks of life – excel in. Once 
the Lebanese themselves are finally in charge of the 
process, the best external actors can do is to leave 
them alone. 
A settlement along the lines of the Lebanese Taif 
accord, including a locally adapted form of sectarian 
power-sharing, has been proposed as a solution to the 
conflict in Syria.108 Such ideas misread the intentions 
of political and militant leaders on nearly all sides, as 
well as the nature of their claims to political leader-
ship. Only the PYD, the decisive power among Syria’s 
Kurds, builds its claims on the distinct character of a 
certain part of the Syrian population; accordingly, it 
will go along with any solution that awards formal 
recognition to the factual autonomy it has to a large 
degree already achieved on the ground. The ideologi-
cal and political agendas of all other sides explicitly 
rule out awarding any legitimacy, let alone a share of 
power, to actors on the other side of the regime/oppo-
sition divide, and in the case of some actors on the 
opposition side, for anybody who does not subscribe 
to their particular interpretation of Islam. 
Organizing political representation along sectarian 
lines would also fail to reflect the complex loyalties, 
preferences, and fears of most of the Syrian popula-
tion. Even after nearly three years of war and sectarian 
atrocities, there is little indication that a significant 
proportion of Syria’s Sunni majority defines itself 
primarily in sectarian terms or awards legitimacy to 
leaders on the basis of their communal allegiances. 
Significant numbers of Sunnis continue to support the 
regime, live in regime-controlled areas, or flee there 
for safety, while populations in the “liberated” areas 
resist groups that impose themselves on the basis of 
extremist Sunni religious ideology. Likewise, it is not 
clear that the fear of retribution and Islamist extrem-
ism that has forced Alawis and other minorities to 
108  Stephan Rosiny, “Power Sharing in Syria: Learning 
from Lebanon’s Taif Experience,” Middle East Policy 20, no. 3 
(fall 2013), http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-
archives/power-sharing-syria-lessons-lebanons-taif-experience. 
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lend support to the Assad regime has led more than 
a small part of these groups to define themselves in 
communal terms, let alone accept the Assad regime as 
the true representative of communal interest. While 
this should be good news, it may also mean that pro-
posing sectarian power-sharing would create strong 
incentives for political leaders to create precisely the 
homogenous identification and unified representation 
of sectarian communities upon which such systems 
are predicated in order to maximize their own claim 
to power. Amidst a violent conflict, the most effective 
means to this end would be more violence, also within 
communities; in a post-conflict situation it would lock 
Syrian citizens into these categories for generations to 
come. 
At any rate, events on the ground make it appear 
highly unlikely that this or any other master plan 
to re-engineer Syria’s political system will be on the 
agenda any time soon. Instead, a gradual stabilization 
of front lines and an uneasy cohabitation of regime- 
and rebel-held areas may be the least bad scenario 
available in the medium term. In the absence of a 
comprehensive solution, it would be both sensible and 
urgent for Europe to focus on humanitarian cease-fires 
and humanitarian access, and on persuading all com-
batants to commit themselves to respect international 
humanitarian law. That would require at least in-
directly engaging with all rebel groups with consider-
able influence on the ground: alongside the so-called 
moderate rebels of the FSA also parts of the Islamist 
spectrum and the PYD. Where stabilization succeeds, 
humanitarian aid should be combined with support 
for the establishment of inclusive local self-govern-
ance structures that create an effective practical alter-
native to the rule of the Assad regime, and rebuild 
Syria one region at a time. Such strategies may raise 
concern over consequences for the unity of the state, 
yet if local structures of governance could be made 
inclusive and participatory, investing them with real 
power may provide a much more resilient and reliable 
check against authoritarian tendencies and marginali-
zation than tinkering with arrangements at the level 
of central executive power ever could. 
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